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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ATTORNEY 
RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR FEES OF AN OPPOSING PARTY 
 
Amy Salyzyn* 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The American civil litigation system has a number of 
distinguishing features.  This reality has led scholars of 
comparative civil procedure to remark upon and consider the 
consequences of what they have termed “American 
exceptionalism” in civil procedure.1  One commonly cited example 
of “exceptional” American procedure is the “American rule” of 
costs allocation or the “no cost-shifting rule”: the losing party is 
not required to indemnify the prevailing party for the court costs 
and attorney fees that the prevailing party has incurred in the 
course of the litigation.
2
   
 
Notwithstanding this general rule, there are a number of 
circumstances in which a party in the American system may be 
indemnified for expenses incurred in a lawsuit.
3
  One such 
circumstance is the case in which an attorney is found to have 
improperly conducted himself or herself and, as a result, is held to 
be personally responsible for the attorney fees of an opposing 
party.  The United States is not unique in empowering courts to 
impose personal responsibility upon a lawyer for the costs of 
                                                        
* J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, J.D., University of Toronto. The author 
completed an earlier draft of this paper during her L.L.M. studies at Yale Law 
School in the context of a course entitled “Comparative Civil Procedure” taught 
by Professor John H. Langbein. The author is grateful to Professor Langbein for 
his insights, encouragement and helpful comments. 
1
 See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 280-281 (2002) (stating that civil procedure in 
comparative perspective reveals that American disputing is an example of 
exceptionalism); see also Scott Dodson, Review Essay, The Challenge of 
Comparative Civil Procedure Civil Litigation in Comparative Context, 60 ALA. 
L. REV. 133, 141 (2008) (stating that “American procedure is particularly 
different because of its strong exceptionalism”); see also Richard L. Marcus, 
Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 709, 709 (2005) (explaining that American proceduralists have not 
been comparativists in large part due to American exceptionalism). 
2
 See Dodson, supra note 1, at 141 (noting the “exceptional” nature of the 
“American rule” of cost allocation); see also Marcus, supra note 1, at 709–12 
(discussing that America has a set of procedural characteristics that set it off 
from the rest of the world); see also James R. Maxeiner, Cost and Fee 
Allocation in Civil Procedure, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 215–17 (2010) 
(characterizing a “no indemnity practice” as being “peculiar to America”). 
3
 See John F. Vargo, The American Rule of Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured 
Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1567, 1629 (1993). 
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litigation.  However, this power of the courts has not been the 
subject of any comparative scholarship.  In this paper, I compare 
the American practice of requiring attorneys to pay personally the 
fees of opposing parties to analogous practices in two other 
common law jurisdictions: England and Canada.    
  
Comparing the law in this area in England and Canada to 
the law in the United States is a useful endeavor because each 
country shares in the common law tradition but also differs from 
each other in material respects.  Unlike the United States, both 
England and Canada implement a “loser pays” system of costs.  
Further, in the context of considering an attorney’s personal 
liability for costs, England has historically differed from Canada 
and the United States in one material respect in its approach to 
lawyer regulation:  until very recently, English law recognized the 
doctrine of “advocates’ immunity.”  Under this doctrine, discussed 
below, both barristers and solicitors enjoyed significant immunity 
from liability to clients in negligence. 
 
Given these material differences among the three countries, 
one might predict that each country would employ a unique 
approach to assessing the circumstances in which lawyers should 
be required to pay costs personally due to improper conduct.  In 
fact, the law in each country on this issue reveals a trend of 
convergence.  The United States, England, and Canada have all 
shifted in recent years to the use of an objective test that imports a 
standard of negligence in determining if a lawyer should be 
personally responsible for litigation costs. 
The first three sections of this paper will consist of a 
country-by-country review of developments over the last several 
decades in relation to an attorney’s personal liability for costs, 
beginning with the United States and continuing with England and 
then Canada.  In order to make this task manageable with respect 
to the two federal countries studied, I have limited my analysis 
with respect to the United States to the federal court system and in 
regards to Canada, to the province of Ontario.  The fourth and final 
section of this paper will be devoted to exploring the following two 
questions:  (a) what might be the reason (or reasons) that explain 
this cross-jurisdictional trend toward a negligence standard, and (b) 
is this trend desirable?  With respect to the first inquiry, my 
analysis will focus on what connections might drawn between the 
cross-jurisdictional move to a negligence standard and broader 
incursions on the self-regulation of lawyers in each of these 
countries in recent years. Regarding the second inquiry, I will 
consider the coherence (or lack thereof) of importing a negligence 
standard into this context.  Ultimately, I argue that there are a 
number of reasons to be concerned about the adoption of a 
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negligence standard in this area and highlight several issues for 
further consideration. 
 
I. THE UNITED STATES 
 
In the United States, federal courts have both inherent 
jurisdiction and statutory authority to require a lawyer to pay the 
attorney fees of an opposing party resulting from attorney conduct 
that the court determines is improper. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that the federal courts’ exercise of their inherent 
jurisdiction to assess such attorney’s fees requires a finding of 
conduct either “constituting” or “tantamount to” bad faith.4  In 
addition to this inherent jurisdiction, there are two main statutory 
mechanisms that empower federal courts to require an attorney to 
pay all or part of an opposing party’s attorney fees:  28 U.S.C. § 
1927 and Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5
  With 
respect to Section 1927,
6
 the circuit courts have generally held that 
bad faith, recklessness, or intentional misconduct must be made 
out before fees may be imposed on a lawyer personally.
7
  In 
                                                        
4
 See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980) (holding that the 
court must make a finding as to whether counsel’s conduct was tantamount to 
bad faith preceding any sanction). 
5
 See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980) (stating that any attorney who so multiplies the 
proceedings in any case vexatiously may be required to satisfy the attorneys’ 
fees incurred because of such conduct); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (stipulating 
that if warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on a motion for 
sanctions the attorney’s fees incurred). It should be noted that, in addition to 
Rule 11, there are several other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which 
authorize federal courts to require an attorney to pay the attorney fees of an 
opposing party. See, e.g.,  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(2) (stating that, instead of or in 
addition to any other sanction, the court is required to order that the party and/or 
its attorney pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of non-compliance 
with the rule, including attorney’s fees); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) 
(threatening sanctions, including attorney’s fees, if certain documents are 
unsigned). 
6
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 (2012) provides:   
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any 
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so 
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally 
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably 
incurred because of such conduct. 
7
 See Lindsey Simmons-Gonzalez, Comment, Abandoning the American Rule: 
Imposing Sanctions on an Empty Head Despite a Pure Heart, 34 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 307, 316–18 (2009). As observed by Simmons-Gonzalez, although 
generally a standard of bad faith, recklessness, or intentional misconduct has 
been found to be required, the circuit courts have taken significantly different 
approaches as to how this needs to be established. See id. For example, the 
Tenth Circuit recently held that an objective standard applies to Section 1927 
and permits fee awards against attorneys who manifest “intentional or reckless 
disregard of [their] duties to the court,” Kornfeld v. Kornfeld, 393 F. App’x 575, 
74 ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL [Vol. 3, No. 2 
& COMPARATIVE LAW 
 
contrast, Rule 11 now employs an objective standard from which 
liability may be found on the basis of negligent conduct.  In its 
original form as introduced in 1938, Rule 11 had been interpreted 
as imposing a subjective standard that focused on the bad faith of 
the attorney.
8
  The evolution of Rule 11 will be the focus of the 
following sections. 
 
A. The Introduction of Rule 11 in 1938 
 
As first enacted in 1938, Rule 11 required that every 
pleading be signed by an attorney of record
9
 and provided, inter 
alia: 
 
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate 
by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best 
of his knowledge, information, and belief there is 
good ground to support it; and that it is not 
interposed for delay.  If a pleading is not signed or 
is signed with the intent to defeat the purpose of the 
rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the 
action may proceed as though the pleading had not 
been served.  For a wilful violation of this rule an 
attorney may be subjected to appropriate 
disciplinary action.
10
 
 
Rule 11 was not an entirely new procedural innovation in 1938.  
As observed by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee
11
 in 
accompanying notes to Rule 11, the rule “consolidated a number of 
pleading practices found in (1) certain code states at the time the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, (2) the former 
federal equity rules, and (3) English practice.”12 
                                                                                                                            
579 (10th Cir. 2010), while the Second Circuit recently confirmed that section 
1927 requires subjective bad faith of counsel, Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. 
v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 834 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
8
 See  FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (stating 
that Rule 11 was amended to remedy the subjective bad-faith standard of the 
original rule). 
9
 In cases where a party was self-represented, that party was required to sign the 
pleading himself and state his address.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
10
 See id.   
11
 See J. Thomas F. Hogan, The Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, UNITED STATE COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ 
RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2010) 
(providing an account of the federal rulemaking process, focusing on the 
Advisory Committee’s role in that process). 
12
 5A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1331 (3d ed. Supp. 2010).  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 
advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment; But see D. Michael 
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In several respects, the original Rule 11 embodied a 
subjective test.  Regarding the propriety of the pleading at issue, 
the rule mandated an inquiry into what the attorney knew and 
believed of the pleading:  whether to “the best of his knowledge, 
information, and belief,” the pleading was supported by “good 
grounds” and “not interposed for delay.” The “awareness standard” 
contained in this part of the rule “mirrored both the early equity 
signature and code pleading verification standards as to merits and 
extended only to matters within the knowledge and belief of the 
attesting party.”13 
 
The sanction provisions under the original Rule 11 also 
invoked a subjective test.
14
  As originally enacted, Rule 11 
provided two non-exclusive options:  (a) striking the pleading; or 
(b) disciplining the attorney.  A signed pleading could only be 
struck if the court found the pleading to have been signed “with 
intent to defeat the purpose of the rule.”  Similarly, an attorney 
could only be disciplined if he or she committed an intentional 
(i.e., “wilful”) violation of the rule.  An improper motive on the 
part of the attorney was, therefore, a necessary requirement for 
sanctions. 
 
On its face, then, the text of the original Rule 11 mandated 
two phases of subjective inquiry.  First, in order to find that the 
rule had been violated, it was necessary for the court to conclude 
that—contrary to what the attorney certified by his signature—it 
was not the case that to the best of his knowledge, information, and 
belief there was good ground to support the pleading and that the 
pleading was not interposed for delay.  Second, if a violation of the 
rule was found, the court needed to find that the attorney 
intentionally violated the rule before imposing a sanction. 
 
Prior to being amended in 1983, Rule 11 was rarely used.  
The first reported case of a Rule 11 motion is not found until 
1950.
15
  Between 1938 and 1976, only 19 cases of Rule 11 motions 
                                                                                                                            
Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement:  Some “Striking” Problems 
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 8 n.20 (1976) 
(highlighting how the enforcement provisions of Rule 11 were not properly 
drafted). 
13
 See Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First 
Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO ST. L. J. 665, 706–07 (2000) (discussing how 
the original version of Rule 11 was composed of two subjective elements).  
14
 Id. 
15
 See Risinger, supra note 12, at 35 n.115 (noting that United States v. Long, 10 
F.R.D. 443 (D. Neb. 1950) is the first reported case of a “genuine adversary” 
Rule 11 motion). 
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are reported.
16
  In those few cases where courts heard Rule 11 
motions, the courts were faithful to the subjective test embodied in 
the text of the rule.  An example of the court applying a subjective 
test under Rule 11 can be found in the first reported case in 1950, 
United States v. Long.
17
   In this case, the plaintiff had moved to 
strike the defendant’s answer that had consisted solely of “a 
general denial made in a single sentence.”  In reply to the motion, 
counsel for the defendant filed a brief affirming the defendant’s 
intention to “put into issue every allegation of plaintiff's complaint 
upon the trial of this cause.”  Given the nature of the complaint, the 
court commented on the “improbability” of the defendant actually 
intending to deny each and every allegation of the plaintiff.  
Nonetheless, the court denied the Rule 11 motion, noting “counsel 
for the defendant…assures this court that his client intends to 
controvert ‘every allegation of the plaintiff's complaint’” and 
holding that the court was “compelled to accept those assurances 
as being tendered in good faith.”18  Following United States v. 
Long, the courts continued to frame the question under Rule 11 as 
requiring a demonstration that the attorney had failed to act in 
“good faith.”19  This high standard, along with uncertainty 
regarding when sanctions should be brought and what sanctions 
were available,
20
 is often cited as the reason why Rule 11 motions 
were so rarely brought. 
 
B. The Introduction of a Negligence Standard: The 1983 
Amendments to Rule 11 
                                                        
16
 See id. at 34–37 (showing how cases have rarely imposed sanctions on Rule 
11 grounds). 
17
 United States v. Long, 10 F.R.D. 443, 444 (D. Neb. 1950) (holding that the 
defendant did not violate Rule 11 because he acted in good faith).  
18
 See id. at 445. 
19
 See, e.g., Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (noting that 
“the basic question is whether the attorneys in good faith believed there was 
good ground to support the charges”); see also Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 
339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that “[t]he standard under Rule 11 . . . is bad 
faith”).   
20
 5A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1331 (3d ed. Supp. 2010) explains the issue of 
ambiguity as follows: 
By the early 1980's experience had shown that Rule 11 rarely 
was utilized and appeared to be ineffective in deterring abuses 
in federal civil litigation. A significant contributing factor 
apparently was the inherent ambiguity of the original rule. As 
the Advisory Committee noted in connection with the 1983 
amendment: “There has been considerable confusion as to (1) 
the circumstances that should trigger striking a pleading or 
motion or taking disciplinary action, (2) the standard of 
conduct expected of attorneys who sign pleadings and 
motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate 
sanctions.” (footnotes omitted). 
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In 1983, amendments were introduced to Rule 11.  The 
Advisory Committee characterized the amendments as correcting 
for the failure of the originally enacted rule to deter litigation 
abuses effectively.
21
  Additionally, the Committee observed that 
there had been “considerable confusion as to (1) the circumstances 
that should trigger striking a pleading or motion or taking 
disciplinary action, (2) the standard of conduct expected of 
attorneys who sign pleadings and motions, and (3) the range of 
available and appropriate sanctions.”22 
 
 The main motivation behind the 1983 amendments appears 
to have been the growing concern at the time with the litigation 
culture in the federal courts.  As summarized by Paul Carrington 
and Andrew Wasson, “[t]he 1983 version of Rule 11 was designed 
to address a perceived social problem—that there were too many 
civil proceedings and too much motion practice in federal courts 
and that this costly excess was the result of neglect, indifference, 
or misuse of procedure by counsel.”23  Georgene Vairo has 
attributed the choice of the Advisory Committee to seek to address 
this problem through Rule 11, in particular, to the failure of 
Committee’s previous attempt in 1970 to curb litigation abuses 
through amendments to Rule 37’s provisions dealing with 
discovery-related misconduct.
24
  Rule 11 was a natural choice for 
the Committee to use as a reforming mechanism “because it was 
the only rule dealing with attorney conduct per se.”25 
 
 An additional possible motivation behind the Rule 11 
amendments, although not explicitly acknowledged by the 
Advisory Committee, was the perceived need to more effectively 
                                                        
21
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
22
 See id. (discussing the confusion surrounding frivolous motions and 
pleadings, including when to strike a motion or pleading, or what sanctions are 
available and appropriate to levy against an attorney for filing a frivolous motion 
or pleading). 
23
 See Paul D. Carrington & Andrew Wasson, A Reflection on Rulemaking: The 
Rule 11 Experience, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 564 (2004) (discussing that the 
1983 amendment was designed to remedy the perceived abuse of motion 
practice in civil litigation). However, the authors further observe, that: 
“[w]hether there was or is in fact such a problem remains uncertain. There had 
been an increase in civil filings in the decade of the 1970s, but much of it was 
explained by changes in substantive law, notably in the field of civil rights.” See 
id. 
24
 See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
589, 594–96 (1998) (explaining the historical background surrounding  Rule 
37’s ineffectiveness, and the rise of Rule 11’s use in its place).  
25
 See id. at 595 (noting how Rule 11 was drafted to directly address the claims 
attorneys can bring in court by requiring an attorney’s signature endorsing any 
document submitted to the court). 
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punish attorney misconduct.
26
  In the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
behavior of attorneys was under particular scrutiny.  In 1976, then 
Chief Justice Warren Burger expressed his alarm at the 
“widespread feeling that the legal profession and judges are overly 
tolerant to lawyers who exploit the inherently contentious aspects 
of the adversary system to their own private advantage at public 
expense.”27  The involvement of lawyers “in the Watergate scandal 
had pushed the profession’s public image to new lows.”28  As 
public criticism of lawyers was growing, the American Bar 
Association (“ABA”) was taking steps during this time period to 
be more aggressive in enforcing professional norms.  In 1970, the 
ABA replaced the largely aspirational Canons of Professional 
Ethics promulgated in 1908 with a Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility “containing black-letter law known as Disciplinary 
Rules…. [the violation of which would result] not merely in 
fraternal disapprobation but in disciplinary adjudication, with 
court-imposed penalties.”29  In 1983, the same year as the 
amendments to Rule 11, the ABA supplanted the Model Code with 
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility “which consisted more 
or less exclusively of specific, legally cognizable rules drafted by a 
quasilegislative process.”30  The environment in which the 1983 
amendments to Rule 11 took place, therefore, was one of 
significantly increased scrutiny of lawyer conduct and of interest in 
increased regulation of the profession. 
 
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 introduced several major 
changes, including: (1) extending the rule to apply not only to 
pleadings but to motions and all other litigation “papers”; (2) 
making the imposition of sanctions mandatory upon a finding that 
the rule had been violated; and (3) explicitly including among the 
available sanctions an order that the offending attorney pay the 
“reasonable attorney’s fee” of an opposing party.31  Of particular 
                                                        
26
 See S. M. Kassin, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS, 29 (Federal 
Judicial Center 1985), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/rule11study.pdf/$file/rule11study.pdf 
(explaining that while the Advisory Committee articulated only a deterrence 
rationale, the need to punish more effectively may have also prompted the Rule 
11 amendments).   
27
 See H.R. REP. 104-62, at 9 (1995).  
28
 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 200 (2000) (discussing how the role that the lawyers played 
in the Watergate Scandal led the ABA to require law schools teach a class on 
professional responsibility). 
29
 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 
1251 (1991). 
30
 See DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY 
IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 233 (2008). 
31
 See FED. R. CIV. P 11 ; see also Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical 
Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 191 n.8 (1988) (recognizing that courts had been split 
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importance to the analysis here is the language change in the part 
of the rule addressing the significance to be attributed to the 
attorney’s signature on the pleading.  After the 1983 amendments, 
Rule 11 provided inter alia: 
 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, 
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost 
of litigation.
32
  
 
The language in the original rule requiring a “wilful violation” was 
replaced with language requiring that the attorney conduct a 
“reasonable inquiry” into the appropriateness and sufficiency of 
the pleading.  This change imposed an affirmative duty that the 
attorney conduct “some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the 
law.”33  The Advisory Committee indicated that this duty was to be 
measured by the standard of “reasonableness under the 
circumstances.”34  Bad faith was no longer a precondition and, 
under the amended wording, “merely negligent or reckless 
behavior” could result in sanctions.35  In short, the 1983 
amendments “shift[ed] the focus away from inquiring into what the 
attorney actually knew about the law and facts of the case when he 
or she filed a pleading….[to] what the lawyer should have known 
after conducting a ‘reasonable inquiry.’”36  
 
 The 1983 amendments had a dramatic effect on the 
frequency of Rule 11 motions.  Within five years, over 1,000 Rule 
11 cases were reported
37
 and, by 1991, over 3,000 cases.
38
  
                                                                                                                            
prior to the amendment as to whether the original version of Rule 11 permitted 
the payment of attorney fees). 
32
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (emphasis added). 
33
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note. 
34
 See id.   
35
 See Vairo, supra note 31, at 193 (excluding bad faith as a requirement to 
sanction an attorney under the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 motions).  
36
 See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L. 
REV. 943, 947–48 (1992) (showing that the 1983 amendments switched the 
inquiry about a lawyer’s knowledge of a case from a subjective approach to an 
objective approach).  
37
 See Alan E. Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE 
L.J., 901, 901 (1988). 
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Although some early cases following the 1983 amendments 
continued using a subjective “bad faith” standard, by the end of 
1986 all the circuits acknowledged that the amended rule imposed 
an objective standard of reasonable inquiry.
39
  In addition to 
requiring that the attorney conduct an objectively reasonable 
inquiry into the facts and law underlying the claim, a number of 
courts held that the amended rule also imposed a reasonableness 
requirement on the attorney’s determination that the pleading was 
proper.
40
  As articulated by the Second Circuit in Eastway 
Construction Corp. v. City of New York, “sanctions shall be 
imposed against an attorney…where, after reasonable inquiry, a 
competent attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the 
pleading is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law 
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal 
of existing law.”41 
 
The language adopted by the court in Eastway Construction 
and by the Advisory Committee in introducing the amended Rule 
11 closely tracks language used in articulating the standard of care 
owed by an attorney to his or her client in the legal malpractice 
context.
42
  A number of courts have recognized that the revised 
Rule 11 effectively adopted a negligence standard or, at the very 
least, a standard closely comparable to negligence.  The Supreme 
Court has made obiter references to a negligence standard being 
employed by Rule 11 in two cases.  In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp.,
43
 Justice O’Connor observed that “the considerations 
involved in the Rule 11 context are similar to those involved in 
determining negligence.”44  A year later, in Business Guides, Inc. 
v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc.,
45
 the Supreme 
Court considered whether Rule 11 imposed a duty of an 
objectively reasonable inquiry on parties (as opposed to only 
attorneys) who sign pleadings, motions, or other papers.  The 
                                                                                                                            
38
 See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 
60 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 480 (1991) (displaying the increase in Rule 11 
motions by 1991).  
39
 See GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES 
AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES 5–9 (2d ed. 1992).  
40
 See id.  
41
 See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253–54 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (explaining the replacement of subjective bad faith with a standard of 
how a competent attorney might reasonably act under the circumstances). 
42
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 (2011) 
(stating that in order to avoid liability for professional negligence, a lawyer 
“must exercise the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in 
similar circumstances”). 
43
 See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). 
44
 Id. at 402. 
45
 See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’n. Enters, Inc., 498 U.S. 533 
(1991).
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majority found that Rule 11 did impose such a duty on the parties 
as well.  In a dissent, Justice Kennedy made explicit reference to 
“the majority’s negligence standard.”46  A number of lower courts 
have also explicitly drawn the connection between the 1983 
amendments and the imposition of a negligence standard.  For 
example, in Hays v. Sony Corp. of America,
47
 the Seventh Circuit 
commented that “in effect, [Rule 11] imposes a negligence 
standard, for negligence is a failure to use reasonable care” and 
that Rule 11, therefore, “defines a new form of legal 
malpractice.”48  In Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A.,49 
the Seventh Circuit similarly noted that because Rule 11 
“establishes a new form of negligence (legal malpractice),” the rule 
“creates duties to one’s adversary and to the legal system, just as 
tort law creates duties to one’s client.”50  The Third Circuit has 
also characterized the 1983 amendments as having been intended 
“to prevent abuse caused not only by bad faith but by negligence 
and, to some extent, by professional incompetence.”51    
 
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 drew considerable 
criticism.  As observed by Vairo, “in contrast to its pre-1983 
obscurity, amended Rule 11 met with more controversy than 
perhaps any other Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.”52  Following 
the 1983 amendments, both academic commentators and legal 
                                                        
46
 Id. at 566 (asserting that the majority’s standard was simply a negligence 
standard). 
47
 Hays v. Sony Corp. of Amer., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988), abrogated on 
other grounds by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). 
48
 See Hays v. Sony Corp. of Amer., 847 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(explaining the role that Rule 11 plays in legal malpractice claims); see also 
Vista Mfg., Inc. v. Trac-4, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 134, 137 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (noting 
that the Rule 11 standard is an objective one, which imposes sanctions on 
attorneys who fail to use reasonable care); see also PaineWebber, Inc. v. Can 
Am Fin. Grp., 121 F.R.D. 324, 330 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
49
 Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989). 
50
 See id. at 932 (indicating that attorneys owe a duty to their adversaries and  
the legal system to avoid excessive legal expenses and wasting the court’s time); 
see also Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the court’s ability to 
impose Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys who assert baseless claims). 
51
 See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987) (confirming that 
negligence is sufficient to impose Rule 11 sanctions and that a finding of bad 
faith is not necessary); see also Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 156 
(3d Cir. 1986) (holding that a finding of subjective bad faith is not the only 
predicate to a Rule 11 violation). 
52
 See Vairo, supra note 24, at 591 (noting that there have been numerous 
commentaries and journal articles analyzing and critiquing the application of 
Rule 11);  see also Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure 
Reform in Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 675, 679 (1997) (explaining that the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 suffered 
severe criticisms, particularly with respect to the federal circuits’ failure to 
uniformly apply Rule 11). 
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practitioners reached the conclusion that Rule 11 was being 
overused, that it was burdening court dockets with satellite 
litigation, and that it was generating an undue “chilling effect” on 
novel or unusual claims.
53
  During this period of time, the threat of 
a potential Rule 11 motion loomed large for attorneys.  In one 
study of attorneys practicing in the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits, 32% of respondents indicated that they had been counsel 
or co-counsel in a federal district court case where a Rule 11 
motion or show cause order had been brought during the last 
year.
54
  Because the most commonly ordered sanction for violating 
Rule 11 following the 1983 amendments was attorneys’ fees,55 
which could be quite substantial,
56
 parties had a strong incentive to 
bring Rule 11 motions.   The “new form of negligence” established 
by the amendments to Rule 11 had taken on a life of its own. 
 
C. The Addition of Safeguards:  The 1993 Amendments to 
Rule 11 
 
In response to criticisms of the 1983 amendments, Rule 11 
was further amended in 1993.
57
  This set of amendments 
introduced a number of provisions that had the aim of tempering 
the use and effect of the rule.  Although sanctions had become 
mandatory in the 1983 amendments, the 1993 rule reverted to 
                                                        
53
 For a discussion of criticisms of the 1983 amendments, see 5A CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1332 (3d ed. Supp. 2010) (asserting that Rule 11 has a 
chilling effect on vigorous advocacy especially for public interest and civil 
rights plaintiffs); see also Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to 
“Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State 
Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1082–83 (1994) ; see also Vairo, 
supra note 38, at 484–86  (arguing that Rule 11 has a chilling effect on zealous 
advocacy, particularly in civil rights, employment discrimination, certain kinds 
of securities fraud, and RICO cases). 
54
 See Marshall, supra note 36, at 952.  
55
 See STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE 
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, 36 
(1989); see also GREGORY JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF 
LITIGATION ABUSE 1-13 (4th ed. 2011).  
56
 Two extreme examples of this can be found in the Eleventh Circuit case of 
Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 1048 
(1992), wherein the court affirmed the district court’s order finding plaintiffs’ 
lead counsel, counsel’s law firm, and the plaintiffs were jointly and severally 
liable for over $1 million in fees. 
57
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1993). The version of Rule 11 following the 
1993 amendments essentially continues to be the rule in place today.  Following 
the 1993 amendments, Rule 11 was again amended in 2007.  These 
amendments, however, introduced only stylistic changes in addition to a 
provision that all papers include the signer’s email address. 
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permissive sanctions.
58
  The 1983 rule was further softened by 
adding a “safe harbor” provision that requires a party to wait 21 
days after serving a motion under Rule 11 before filing the motion, 
in order to allow for the served party to withdraw or correct the 
challenged litigation paper.
59
  The purpose was to encourage a 
party to “to abandon a questionable contention” without fear that 
the abandonment could be used as evidence of a Rule 11 
violation.
60
  Additionally, the 1993 amendments clarified that the 
court could issue Rule 11 sanctions on its own initiative, but only 
through a show cause order.
61 
 
With respect to the standard to be applied to attorney 
conduct, the 1993 version of Rule 11 retained an objective test 
requiring the signing attorney to certify the paper’s appropriateness 
“to the best of [his or her] knowledge, information, and belief, 
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.”62  
Further, the 1993 amendments deleted the previous exception for 
“good faith arguments” for the extension, modification or reversal 
of existing law, and replaced it with an exception for “nonfrivolous 
argument[s].”63  This change “eliminate[d] any possibility of 
reading the language in Rule 11 as establishing a subjective 
standard.”64   
 
Regarding sanctions, the 1993 amendments emphasized the 
deterrent purpose of the rule, introducing language into Rule 11 
                                                        
58
 See id. (providing that if the court determines that a violation has occurred, the 
court “may impose an appropriate sanction”). 
59
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (stating that a motion for sanctions must describe 
the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b) but cannot be filed within 
21 days after service or within another time the court sets). 
60
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory comm. notes (1993) (stating that under the 
1993 amendments, a timely withdrawal of a questionable contention will protect 
a party against a motion for sanctions). 
61
 See id. (requiring a show cause order when the court issues Rule 11 sanctions 
sua sponte in order to provide the person with notice and an opportunity to 
respond); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (limiting sanctions to those sufficient 
to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others in similar 
situations). 
62
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (stating that the objective test for attorney 
certification applies to pleadings, written motions, or other papers, whether by 
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating the motion for sanctions). 
63
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (obligating that claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions presented to the court are warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law). 
64
 See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1335 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) (illustrating that removing the “good faith” 
terminology in the prior text and replacing it with a “nonfrivolous” benchmark 
prohibits interpreting the language of Rule 11 as establishing a subjective 
standard). 
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that “a sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what 
suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct 
by others similarly situated.”65   The Advisory Committee notes to 
the 1993 amendments state that “since the purpose of Rule 11 
sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate, the rule provides 
that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid 
into court as a penalty.”66  In practice, awards of attorney fees have 
decreased since the 1993 amendments but remain common.
67
  
 
The number of Rule 11 motions also decreased 
significantly following the 1993 amendments.
68
  One reason may 
be that the amendments eliminated the possibility for a defendant 
to file a Rule 11 motion after the court has adjudicated the merits 
of the claim.
69
  As noted by Charles Yablon, “under the 1993 
version of Rule 11, and the subsequent case law, parties cannot 
make Rule 11 motions after the merits of the case have been 
decided, since that would deprive the opposing party of their safe 
harbor withdrawal rights [under the rule].”70  As a result, the 
moving party is deprived “of the powerful ‘hindsight effect’ under 
which [a judge], having just dismissed or having decided to 
dismiss a case as non-meritorious, [is] then asked whether the 
claim lacked such a basis in law or fact that it should never have 
been brought in the first place.”71   
 
Following the 1993 amendments, the courts have continued 
to acknowledge that Rule 11 imposes a standard of “objective 
                                                        
65
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (explaining the scope of sanctions under Rule 11). 
66
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory comm. note (1993) (maintaining that the 
purpose of the sanctions is to deter parties, not compensate them).   
67
 See GREGORY JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 
2–265 (4th ed. 2008); see also Howard A. Cutler, Comment, A Practitioner’s 
Guide to the 1993 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 67 TEMP. 
L. REV. 265, 292 (1994) (suggesting that under the 1993 amendment, judges 
will not consistently award attorneys’ fees). 
68
 See Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All these Years: Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its Impact on Federal Civil Rights 
Plaintiffs after the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 104–05 (2002) 
(opining that the decrease in number of federal cases citing Rule 11 is indicative 
of a decrease in the use of the Rule itself); see also Charles Yablon, Hindsight, 
Regret and Safe Harbors in Rule 11 Litigation, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 599, 600 
(2004) (stating that the amendment to Rule 11 could have reduced the number of 
motions filed due to financial considerations). 
69
 See Charles Yablon, Hindsight, Regret and Safe Harbors in Rule 11 
Litigation, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 599, 618–32 (2004) (providing various 
arguments for and against the possibility that the amendments to Rule 11 
decreased its usage in motion practice).   
70
 Id. at 630 (referencing a 1988 study revealing that approximately fifty percent 
of Rule 11 motions occur following the conclusion of an action). 
71
 Id. at 604. 
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reasonableness under the circumstances”72 and have continued to 
recognize the negligence standard inhering in Rule 11.  In 2003, 
the Seventh Circuit again analogized Rule 11 litigation to tort law, 
commenting that the rule "establishes a new form of negligence," 
in which one owes a "duty to one's adversary to avoid needless 
legal costs and delay."
73
  The Fifth Circuit, contrasting Rule 11 to 
Section 1927, observed in 2009 that the former is “about mere 
negligence” as opposed to intentional wrongdoing.74    
 
Notwithstanding the fact that courts have acknowledged 
that Rule 11 imposes a standard of objective reasonableness, 
judges have taken a number of measures to temper the impact of 
using a negligence standard in this context and have judicially 
added to the statutory safeguards implemented by the 1993 
amendments.  For example, one notable exception to the courts’ 
continued use of an objective standard has occurred in the context 
of sua sponte (court-initiated) sanctions.  In the case of In re 
Pennie & Edmonds LLP,
75
 the Second Circuit held that the lack of 
a “safe harbor” provision in the case of court-initiated applications 
of Rule 11 necessitated increased procedural protections in the 
form of a heightened intent element.
76
   Specifically, the court held 
that a “bad faith” standard should apply to the application of Rule 
11 in this context.  The Eighth and Eleventh Circuit have issued 
decisions consistent with the holding in In re Pennie & Edmonds  
LLP, while the First Circuit has explicitly rejected the Second 
Circuit’s approach.77   
 
Further mitigating moves can be found in court decisions 
interpreting the standard of attorney conduct to be applied in non-
court initiated applications.  In the Ninth Circuit, for example, it 
has been held that it is necessary to determine that the complaint is 
legally or factually “baseless” from an objective perspective before 
                                                        
72
 See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & 
RICHARD L. MARCUS,FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1335 (3d ed. Supp. 
2010) (noting that jurisprudence leading up to the 1993 amendment continues to 
serve as valid precedent) ; see also Joseph, supra note 55.  
73
 Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., 319 F.3d 307, 315 (7th Cir. Ill. 2003) (citing Mars 
Steel Corp. v. Cont. Bank , 880 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1989)). 
74
 Vanderhoff v. Pacheco, 344 Fed. Appx. 22, 27 (5th Cir. La. 2009) (citing 
Baulch v. Johns, 70 F.3d 813, 817 (5th Cir. 1995)).  
75
 In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86 (2nd Cir. 2003). 
76
 See id. at 91 (reasoning that it is better to question evidence by the use of 
cross-examination and opposing evidence rather than to inhibit lawyers from 
presenting questionable evidence). 
77
 For a discussion of this divide in the case law, see Sybil Louise Dunlop, Are 
an Empty Head and a Pure Heart Enough? Mens Rea Standards for Judge- 
Imposed Rule 11 Sanctions and Their Effects on Attorney Action, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 615, 631–38 (2008) (comparing the approaches of the First, Second, and 
Fifth Circuits in interpreting In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP). 
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sanctions can be awarded.
78
  Similarly, the First Circuit has 
asserted that “at least culpable carelessness” is required before a 
violation of the Rule can be found.
79
  Moreover, several circuits 
have endorsed a requirement that a legal argument advanced have 
“no chance of success” under existing precedent in order to run 
afoul of the provisions of Rule 11.
80
  The language used in these 
cases reaches beyond conventional understandings of an “objective 
reasonableness” standard to impose a higher threshold before Rule 
11 sanctions are ordered.   
 
As reflected in the above examples, the precise contours of 
the “new form of negligence” instituted by Rule 11 remain to be 
articulated.  This reality can also been seen in the varied 
circumstances in which courts have imposed Rule 11 sanctions.  
Lawyers have been sanctioned under Rule 11 for filing a “generic 
complaint” that listed “hypothetical violations” of the law;81 for 
failing to make a basic inquiry that would have revealed that a 
witness who signed two affidavits and claimed to be an attending 
physician in an operating room had, in fact, been suspended from 
the practice of medicine at the relevant time;
82
 for engaging in 
“blatant forum-shopping”;83 for filing a federal court action in an 
                                                        
78
 See Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that a district court must first determine whether the complaint is legally or 
factually baseless, and then whether the attorney conducted a reasonable 
investigation before signing the complaint). 
79
 See Citibank Global Mkts., Inc. v. Rodríguez Santana, 573 F.3d 17, 32 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (explaining that Rule 11(b) is not a strict liability provision). 
80
 See Simon DeBartolo Grp., L.P. v. Richard E. Jacobs Grp., Inc., 186 F.3d 157, 
167 (2d Cir.1999) (explaining that for a position to be frivolous there must be no 
chance of success and no reasonable argument to amend the current law); see 
also Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., 448 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 
2006) (citing Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 153 (4th Cir. 
2002)) (noting that a legal argument fails to satisfy Rule 11(b) when a 
reasonable attorney in like circumstances could not believe his actions to be 
legally justified); see also Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1278–79 
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that where an attorney signs and files a document after 
conducting a reasonable inquiry, the attorney is not in violation of Rule 11); see 
also Citibank Global Mkts., 573 F.3d 17, 32 (stating that the mere fact that a 
claim ultimately fails is not enough to impose Rule 11 sanctions). 
81
 See Pickern v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1091–92 (E.D. 
Cal. 2004) (holding that the plaintiff’s attorney violated Rule 11 but that 
monetary sanctions were not warranted because counsel thereafter sought to 
amend its pleadings in other matters before the court).  
82
 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Y2K Shipping & Trading Inc., No. 00-CV-5304-SJ, 2004 
WL 896952, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004) (reasoning that the attorney could 
have withdrawn the affidavit pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(A) after learning that it 
was false). 
83
 See Fransen v. Terps LLC, 153 F.R.D. 655, 660 (D. Colo. 1994) (concluding 
that a plaintiff that brought a case in federal court in hopes that the result will be 
more favorable than the holding from state court is blatant forum shopping). 
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attempt to influence a parallel lawsuit in another state;
84
 bringing 
an unwarranted Rule 11 motion;
85
 and for exhibiting “a pattern of 
uncooperativeness and delay [that] had begun before litigation 
even commenced.”86  Given the uncertainty as to what, exactly, a 
negligence standard means in this context and the varied 
circumstances in which Rule 11 sanctions are imposed, it is not 
surprising that concerns remain about Rule 11’s potential “chilling 
effect” on vigorous advocacy or the bringing of novel or creative 
claims.
87
   
 
II. ENGLAND 
 
In England, the power of the court to order a lawyer to pay 
the costs
88
 of an opposing party as a consequence of the lawyer’s 
improper conduct is referred to as the “wasted costs jurisdiction.”   
As in the United States, the authority for this type of order is found 
both in the courts’ inherent jurisdiction to discipline lawyers as 
well as in statutory provisions.  As in the United States, English 
law has also moved over the last several decades to a negligence 
standard and has adopted safeguards to mitigate the potential 
overbreadth resulting from the use of a negligence standard.  
 
A.  The English Courts’ Inherent Jurisdiction 
                                                        
84
 See Devereaux v. Colvin, 844 F. Supp. 1508, 1511–12 (M.D. Fla. 1994) 
(explaining that bringing a suit to influence a pending lawsuit draws the Court’s 
attention away from more important matters, wastes time, and is therefore 
worthy of sanction). 
85
 See Local 106 v. Homewood Mem’l Gardens, Inc., 838 F.2d 958, 961 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (showing that the court will sua sponte sanction a party when they 
file an unwarranted motion for sanctions that disregards the existing law that 
supports opposition’s defense). 
86
 See EEOC v. Milavetz and Assocs., 863 F.2d 613, 614 (8th Cir. 1988), 
abrogated by NAACP–Special Contribution Fund v. Atkins, 908 F. 2d 336 (8th 
Cir. 1990) (quoting what the district court noted and took into consideration in 
granting a motion for attorney fees). 
87
 See Hart, supra note 68 at 105–06 (2002) (arguing that the 1993 amendments 
have not reduced the chilling effects of Rule 11); see also Byron C. Keeling, 
Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of 
Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1093–
94 (1994) (positing that despite the safe harbor provision in the 1993 
amendment to Rule 11, there is still a chilling effect on litigation because there 
is no balanced approach). 
88
 My use of the term “costs” in this section adopts the definition found in Part 
43, Rule 43.2(1)(a) of The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 as including “fees, 
charges, disbursements, expenses, remuneration, reimbursement allowed to a 
litigant in person . . . any additional liability incurred under a funding 
arrangement and any fee or reward charged by a lay representative for acting on 
behalf of a party in proceedings allocated to the small claims track.” See Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998, 1999, S.I. 1998/3132, pt. 43, r. 43.2 (U.K.) (defining the 
scope of the term costs).  
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Until recent developments discussed below, the English 
courts recognized themselves as only having the authority to hold 
solicitors, and not barristers, personally responsible for the costs of 
an opposing party.
89
  This authority was derived from the English 
courts’ inherent jurisdiction to discipline solicitors and has been 
described by the House of Lords as having existed “from time 
immemorial.”90  In Myers v Elman,91 the House of Lords 
canvassed the history of the courts’ inherent disciplinary 
jurisdiction and, specifically, the courts’ authority to order 
solicitors to pay costs personally.  Although the lords did not settle 
on one shared articulation of the appropriate standard to be 
applied, they shared the view “that something more serious was 
required than mere negligence.”92  Lord Maugham stated that 
although “misconduct or default or negligence in the course of the 
proceedings”93 may be sufficient to justify an order of costs against 
a solicitor personally, the jurisdiction of the court to make such an 
order “ought to be exercised only when there has been established 
a serious dereliction of duty.”94  Lord Atkin adopted a comparable 
position, observing that past case law had treated the courts’ 
jurisdiction to award costs against solicitors as including instances 
of “gross negligence” as well as in cases of “disgraceful” or 
“dishonourable” conduct.95  Lord Wright stated that “[a] mere 
mistake or error of judgment is not generally sufficient, but a gross 
neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a solicitor’s duty to 
ascertain with accuracy may suffice.”96  In short, although a 
                                                        
89
 See JACKSON & POWELL ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY (Rupert M. Jackson, 
John L. Powell & Roger Stewart eds., 6th ed. 2007); see also W. Kent Davis, 
The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United States 
the "Odd Man Out" in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
361, 436 n.461 (1999) (citing Moorfield Storey’s statement that the English 
Courts may order a lawyer who has engaged in misconduct to pay the opposing 
party’s fees, and that this rule has been applied to solicitors). 
90
See Myers v. Elman [1940] A.C. 282 302 (U.K.) (acknowledging the power of 
judges and the courts to penalize solicitors for misconduct).  
91
 See id. (highlighting the reasons for applying disciplinary actions towards 
solicitors and the consequences caused by their misconduct). 
92
 See JACKSON & POWELL ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 735 (Rupert M. 
Jackson, John L. Powell & Roger Stewart eds., 6th ed. 2007) (discussing the 
different positions taken on professional liability by the courts in England since 
the eighteenth century).  
93
 See Myers, supra note 90, at 289 (observing that misconduct, default, or 
negligence in the course of a proceeding may justify an order of costs against a 
solicitor personally). 
94
See id. at 291 (urging that courts impose a personal order of costs against a 
solicitor only in cases involving a serious dereliction of duty). 
95
 See id. at 303–04 (noting that past cases in which courts have awarded costs 
against solicitors involved instances of gross negligence or disgraceful conduct). 
96
 See id. at 319 (opining that gross negligence or inaccuracy may justify 
imposition of a personal cost order against a solicitor). 
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subjective standard was not articulated in Myers v. Elman, the 
House of Lords was careful to distinguish instances in which cost 
orders against solicitors would be appropriate from cases of 
“ordinary” negligence.  As explained by Sachs J. in the subsequent 
case of Edwards v. Edwards,
97
 “the mere fact that the litigation 
fails is no reason for invoking the jurisdiction: nor is an error of 
judgment: nor even is the mere fact that an error is of an order 
which constitutes or is equivalent to negligence.”98  A finding of a 
“serious dereliction of duty” was required to ground a wasted costs 
order.
99
 
 
At the time that Myers v. Elman was heard, there were also 
statutory provisions in place addressing cost orders against 
solicitors.  In Myers v. Elman, the House of Lords acknowledged 
the applicable Rule of the Supreme Court
100—Order 65, rule 11—
as providing “the necessary machinery” for the court’s exercise of 
its inherent jurisdiction.
101
  At the time, Order 65, rule 11 gave a 
court the authority to order a solicitor personally liable for costs of 
litigation if it appeared to the court that costs had been 
“improperly” incurred or wasted as a result of “undue delay” or 
“any misconduct or default of the solicitor.”102  Notwithstanding 
                                                        
97
 See Edwards v. Edwards [1958] 2 All E.R. 179, 186 (U.K.) (highlighting the 
distinction between cases involving the kind of negligence warranting cost 
orders against solicitors and those involving ordinary negligence). 
98
 See id. (profiling which situations do not call for grounding a wasted costs 
order). 
99
 See id. (showing what the House of Lords felt was the standard for grounding 
a wasted costs order). 
100
 Prior to the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules in 1999, the Rules of 
the Supreme Court governed procedure in all proceedings in the Supreme Court 
in England. These rules fell under the rule-making power of the Supreme Court 
Rule Committee, which consisted of the members of the bench and bar. The 
term “Supreme Court” referred to the Court of Appeal, the High Court of 
Justice, and the Crown Court prior to the establishment of the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom (the highest appeal court in England) in 2005. These courts 
are now referred to as the “Senior Courts of England and Wales.” See PETER ST. 
JOHN AND LAWRENCE JOSEPH HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 14–15 (3rd ed. 
1983). 
101
 See id. at 189 (explaining where the House of Lords believes the court can 
exercise its inherent jurisdiction). 
102
 Order 65, rule 11 specifically provided, inter alia:    
If in any case it shall appear to the Court or a judge that costs 
have been improperly or without any cause incurred, or that 
by reason of any undue delay in proceeding under any 
judgment or order, or of any misconduct or default of the 
solicitor, any costs properly incurred have nevertheless proved 
fruitless to the person incurring the same, the Court or judge 
may call on the solicitor of the person by whom such costs 
have been so incurred to show cause why such costs should 
not be disallowed as between the solicitor and his client, and 
also (if the circumstances of the case shall require) why the 
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the reference in Order 65, rule 11 to “any misconduct or default of 
the solicitor,” the House of Lords in Myers v. Elman chose to adopt 
what would appear to be a higher standard, requiring “gross 
negligence” or “serious dereliction of duty.” 
 
Order 65, rule 11 was ultimately replaced by a new rule 
introduced in 1961, which was amended in turn in 1966.  The 
revised rule following the 1966 amendments – Order 62, rule 8 – 
retained similar language to that contained in Order 65, rule 11.
103
  
The particular language of the rule, however, continued to have 
little, if any, impact on the practice of courts.  In discussing the 
judicial treatment of the Order 62, rule 8 and its predecessor rules, 
the Court of Appeal observed that these rules stated in the 
commentary contained in successive editions of The Supreme 
Court Practice were intended to “provid[e] machinery for the 
exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction,” as opposed to being 
intended to set out a substantive standard.
104
  The Court of Appeal 
further noted that, consistent with the explanation found in this 
commentary, the courts “required that an applicant seeking an 
order for costs against a solicitor…prove a serious dereliction of 
duty, gross negligence or gross neglect,” regardless of the specific 
wording of associated statutory rule in force.
105
  As a matter of 
practice, the Myers v. Elman standard prevailed irrespective of the 
statutory provision in place governing the personal liability of 
solicitors for the payment of costs. 
 
B.  Beginnings of a Negligence Standard:  1986 Amendments 
to the Supreme Court Rules 
                                                                                                                            
solicitor should not repay to his client any costs which the 
client may have been ordered to pay to any other person, and 
thereupon may make such order as the justice of the case may 
require.  
 
103
 Order 62, rule 8 provided:  
Subject to the following provisions of this rule, where in any 
proceedings costs are incurred improperly or without 
reasonable cause or are wasted by undue delay or by any other 
misconduct or default, “the [c]ourt may make against any 
solicitor whom it considers to be responsible (whether 
personally or through a servant or agent) an order:— 
(a) disallowing the costs as between the solicitor and 
his client; and 
(b) directing the solicitor to repay to his client costs which the 
client has been ordered to pay to other parties to the 
proceedings; or 
(c) directing the solicitor personally to indemnify such other 
parties against costs payable by them.” 
104
 Gupta v. Comer, [1991] 1 Q.B. 629, 631 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
105
 Id.  
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Forty-five years after Myers v. Elman, the case’s hold on 
the applicable standard to be applied to wasted costs orders 
loosened.  In 1986, the Supreme Court Rule Committee replaced 
Order 62, rule 8 with Order 62, rule 11.
106
  The reference in the 
rule to “misconduct or default” was deleted and replaced with new 
language permitting cost awards if costs had “been wasted by 
failure to conduct proceedings with reasonable competence and 
expedition.”107  This change to Order 62, rule 11 was part of more 
extensive amendments to the costs provisions in Supreme Court 
Rules that sought to simplify the taxation of costs and was not the 
subject of specific discussion in the commentary that addressed the 
broader amendments.
108
  The notes accompanying Order 62, rule 
                                                        
106
 Rules of the Supreme Court (Amendment) 1986, SI 632, s. 11. 
107
 The material portions of the new Order 62, rule 11 were as follows: 
“Subject to the following provisions of this rule, where it 
appears to the court that costs have been incurred 
unreasonably or improperly in any proceedings or have been 
wasted by failure to conduct proceedings with reasonable 
competence and expedition, the court may — 
(a) order — 
(i) the solicitor whom it considers to be 
responsible (whether personally or through 
a servant or agent) to repay to his client 
costs which the client has been ordered to 
pay to any other party to the proceedings; or 
(ii) the solicitor personally to indemnify 
such other parties against costs payable by 
them; and 
(iii) the costs as between the solicitor and 
his client to be disallowed.” 
108
 In his Preface to 1988 edition of the Supreme Court Practice, Jack Jacob 
reported on developments relating to the Supreme Court Rule that had taken 
place since the last edition of the guide that had been published in 1985.  In 
addressing the changes to the costs regime, he writes: 
A major development of exceptional merit and importance has 
been the introduction of an entirely new Order 62 relating to 
costs, which implements the recommendations of the Working 
Party on the Simplification of Taxation….One of the main 
objectives of the recommendations was to produce greater 
fairness and justice as between the parties who win and those 
who lose their cases.  The new Order 62 has, as was intended, 
greatly simplified the previous basis for the taxation of costs 
by providing for only two bases for the orders of costs, 
namely, “the standard basis” and “the indemnity basis,” . . . 
The revision and restructuring of Order 62 have produced 
greater clarity and simplicity and a new freshness in the 
complex problems of costs, though no new principle has been 
introduced as a matter of general policy in the award of costs 
to the successful party. 
A summary of the specific changes was reported in the Law Society Gazette at 
the time. See New Costs Regime in the Supreme Court, L. Soc’y Gazette, April 
30, 1986. 
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11 in the 1988 edition of The Supreme Court Practice in which the 
amended rule first appeared also failed to register the change as 
being of any significance and continued to reference the rule as 
being “intended to cover the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.”109 
 
The courts, however, took note of the changed language.  
In 1989, the Court of Appeal addressed the new language of Order 
62, rule 11 in Sinclair-Jones v. Kay.
110  In this case, the plaintiff 
had applied for an order that the defendant’s solicitors personally 
pay her costs and the court was faced with the question of whether 
the “gross misconduct” standard established by Myers v. Elman 
should apply to the solicitors’ conduct or whether Order 62, rule 11 
established a lesser standard rooted in “reasonable competence and 
expedition.”111  In considering this question, May L.J. stated that, 
in his opinion, the purpose of the 1986 amendments was to “widen 
the court’s powers in cases which properly fall within this rule.”112  
Although he did not provide any direct authority for this view, 
May L.J. pointed out that the amended rule had also given taxing 
masters wider powers to impose costs against solicitors 
personally.
113
  The court held that a standard of “reasonable 
competence and expedition” should be applied to applications 
under Order 62, rule 11 in accordance with “its ordinary English 
meaning”114 and in view of “the circumstances of each case.”115  
Although the court in Sinclair-Jones v. Kay did not expressly 
articulate a negligence standard, the Court of Appeal has 
subsequently characterized the reference to "reasonable 
                                                        
109
 SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 965 (Jacob et al. eds.,1988).  
110
 See Sinclair-Jones v. Kay [1989] 1 W.L.R. 114, 114–15, 121 (holding that 
Order 62, Rule 11 allows for the solicitor to be held financially responsible 
despite refraining from gross misconduct, and that case-by-case determination of 
whether the costs are reasonable is also required). 
111
 The facts of this case were that the plaintiff had brought an action against the 
defendant claiming rent arrears and damages for breach of a tenancy agreement 
and had entered judgment in default after no defense had been served.   
Damages were to be assessed at a later hearing. One week after the plaintiff had 
entered default judgment, the defendant was granted legal aid to defend the 
claim. Seven weeks later and only two days before the damages assessment 
hearing, the defendant’s solicitors informed the plaintiff of this development and 
the fact that the defendant intended to apply to have the judgment set aside. At 
the damages assessment hearing, judgment was granted for the rent arrears but 
set aside on the damages claim. The defendant was given leave to amend and no 
costs were ordered in relation to the hearing. The plaintiff then applied for an 
order that the defendant’s solicitors pay her costs personally. The application 
judge dismissed the claim and she appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
112
 See id. at 121 (discussing that the principles laid in prior case law still apply 
despite that the new Order increases the court’s authority). 
113
 See id.(explaining that only after the rule was amended did the taxing 
masters’ powers expand to both substantive and taxation proceedings). 
114
 See id. at 122. 
115
 See id. at 121. 
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competence" as “suggesting the ordinary standard of 
negligence.”116    
 
The reasons why the Supreme Court Rules Committee 
introduced a negligence standard in Order 62, rule 11 as part of a 
set of more extensive amendments to the cost rules are not clear.  
Broader developments taking place at the time in relation to the 
regulation of the legal profession in England may hold some clues 
as to the Committee’s motivations.  In 1983, a public scandal had 
erupted as a result of the Law Society’s failure to act effectively 
against Glanville Davies, a solicitor and a member of the Council 
of the Law Society, who had grossly overbilled a client.
117
  The 
litigation that resulted as well as a subsequent review of the 
situation by the Law Society had “revealed an appalling catalogue 
of errors, insensitivity, and lack of sound judgment on the part of 
the Law Society.”118  The failings of Law Society attracted a 
significant amount of publicity and, in the view of one 
commentator, “led to a complete breakdown of public confidence 
in the Law Society’s ability to regulate professional conduct.”119  
The “Glanville Davies affair” (as this series of events came to be 
called) along with other developments in the mid-1980s—
including the liberalization of restrictions in advertising and the 
passage of legislation ending the conveyancing monopoly that 
solicitors had previously enjoyed—had placed the English legal 
profession under increased scrutiny and generated serious 
questions regarding the desirability of permitting the legal 
profession to self-regulate.
120
  Although there is no indication that 
the changes to Order 62, rule 11 were a direct response to these 
developments, the move to using a negligence standard (and the 
attendant increased power given to the courts to monitor and 
                                                        
116
 See Ridehalgh v. Horsefield [1994] Ch. 205, 229. It should be noted that a 
differently constituted panel of the Court of Appeal criticized the decision in 
Sinclair-Jones v. Kay approximately a year and a half later in Holden & Co. v. 
Crown Prosecution Service [1990] 2 Q.B. 26. The dispute between the panels in 
Sinclair-Jones v. Kay and Holden & Co. v. Crown Prosecution Service, 
however, was ultimately short-lived. A year later, the Court of Appeal addressed 
the split between the two cases in Gupta v. Comer [1991] 1 Q.B. 629. The 
decision ultimately resolved the matter in favor of the approach taken in 
Sinclair-Jones v. Kay of adopting the plain language of Order 62, rule 11. 
117
 The litigation bill at issue was ultimately reduced from £197,000 to £67,000 
upon taxation.  See generally ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 
IN ACTION 392 (3rd ed. 1999) (discussing the “Glanville Davies Affair”).  See 
also MICHAEL BURRAGE, REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE 
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PROFESSION: ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED 
STATES 556–57 (2006). 
118
 See ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM IN ACTION 392 (3d ed. 
1999). 
119
 See id.  
120
 See id. at 39293. 
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punish lawyer misconduct) is consistent with the broader concerns 
that were emerging at the time regarding the profession’s ability to 
regulate itself effectively. 
 
Another particular aspect of the broader background that 
requires note is a feature of English law not paralleled in the 
United States or Canada: “advocates’ immunity” from actions in 
negligence.  Until recently, both barristers and solicitors in 
England were immune from liability arising from the conduct and 
management of a case in court.
121
  This immunity, for example, 
precluded a client from bringing an action in negligence against his 
or her lawyer in relation to a failure to put a defense to the court or 
to call an important witness or in respect of certain conduct that 
occurred outside the courtroom, including advice about pre-trial 
settlements.
122
  In the 1969 case Rondel v. Worsley,
123
 the House of 
Lords clarified that this immunity (which had no statutory basis) 
was based on public policy.  The House of Lords identified three 
public policy rationales for the immunity: (a) the administration of 
justice required that a barrister be able to carry out his or her duty 
to the court fearlessly and independently without the worry of a 
potential lawsuit from a client; (b) negligence actions against 
barristers would inevitably require retrying the original actions, 
which would bring the administration of justice into disrepute by 
prolonging litigation and risking inconsistent decisions; and (c) 
because a barrister was required to accept any client as a result of 
the “cab-rank” rule, it would be unfair “to continue to compel him 
to take cases, yet at the same time to remove his independence and 
immunity.”124  Although the decision in Rondel v. Worsley only 
addressed the immunity granted to barristers, the House of Lords 
confirmed that this immunity extended to solicitors also in the 
subsequent case of Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell & Co.
125 
 
Advocates’ immunity was the subject of great criticism 
towards the end of the twentieth century and was viewed by some 
commentators to be creating an “indefensible” exception in 
                                                        
121
 Matthew Groves & Mark Derham, Should Advocates’ Immunity Continue?, 
28 MELB. U. L. REV. 80, 81 (2004) (stating that in Arthur J S Hall & Co v. 
Simons, the common law doctrine of advocates immunity was abolished). 
122
 Mary Seneviratne, The Rise and Fall of Advocates’ Immunity, 21 LEGAL 
STUDIES 644, 64748 (2001) (detailing the extent of advocates’ immunity in 
English courts). 
123
 See Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C. 191 (upholding immunity for solicitors 
and barristers because it is within the public interest to protect counsel). 
124
 See id. at 276 (listing various public policy interests that are served by 
upholding immunity for barristers and solicitors). 
125
 See Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell, [1980] A.C. 198 (clarifying that the 
immunity enjoyed by barristers applies equally to solicitors). 
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negligence for advocates’ work in court.126  A number of 
commentators “called on Parliament to abolish the immunity, on 
the grounds that it was outdated and based on flimsy public policy 
justifications.”127  The trend in judicial decisions was to interpret 
the immunity strictly and to limit its application through narrowing 
its scope in relation to pre-trial matters.
128
  Ultimately, the House 
of Lords abolished the doctrine of advocates’ immunity in 2000 in 
the “revolutionary”129 case of Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. (a Firm) v. 
Simons.
130
  Although there is no evidence of any direct connection 
between the language change to Order 62, rule 11 and the 
mounting criticisms at the time of the doctrine of advocates’ 
immunity, the increased power given to judges to discipline lawyer 
conduct through the amendments to Order 62, rule 11 is, once 
again, consistent with the larger trend of growing concerns over 
the regulation of lawyers in England.  
 
C. Introduction of an Explicit Negligence Standard:  1991 
Revisions to the Supreme Court Act 
 
In 1990, Parliament passed major legislation that sought to 
address the concerns that had emerged in relation to the regulation 
of the English legal profession.  The Courts and Legal Services 
Act, 1990
131
 was the product of several inquiries into the English 
legal profession that had culminated in the 1989 release of three 
Green Papers
132
 by Lord Mackay, then Lord Chancellor.  Lord 
Mackay’s Green Papers were highly critical of the claim of 
barristers and solicitors to self-regulation and advocated for free 
                                                        
126
 See Mary Seneviratne, The Rise and Fall of Advocates’ Immunity, 21 LEGAL 
STUD. 644, 651 (2001) (noting that immunity has been criticized on the grounds 
that it does not provide a duty of care to clients). 
127
 See id. at 650 (accounting for the growing criticism directed at advocates’ 
immunity in the United Kingdom). 
128
See id. at 647–48 (2001); see also Atwell v. Michael Perry & Co., [1998] 4 
All E.R. 65 (exemplifying how the courts sought to interpret the advocate’s 
immunity strictly by not extending it to giving advice on the prospects of 
appeal); see also Dickinson v. Jones Alexander & Co., [1993] 2 FLR 521 
(holding that the advocates’ immunity did not extend to matters in relation to a 
financial settlement reached after divorce even though the terms of the 
settlement were contained in a consent order). 
129
 See HUGH EVANS, LAWYERS’ LIABILITIES 91 (2002). 
130
 See Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v. Simons, [2002] 1 A.C. 615 (abolishing 
advocates’ immunity, recognizing an advocate’s duty to not mislead the court).  
131
 See The Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990 (reforming the way the legal 
profession and the court system worked). 
132
 See Paul D. Paton, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Future of Self-
Regulation -- Canada Between the United States and the English/Australian 
Experience, 2008 J. PROF. LAW 87, 99 n.56 (2008) (explaining that green papers 
represent the first consideration by the British government of concepts for new 
legislation, and are followed by a period of debate and deliberation, eventually 
leading to the introduction of legislation). 
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competition among legal services providers and for state 
supervision of the bar’s complaints and disciplinary procedures.133  
As summarized by Michael Burrage, “[the Green Papers] heralded 
the end of sovereign, self-governing professions and triumphantly 
proclaimed that market principles were henceforth to govern the 
provision of legal services.”134  The Green Papers prompted an 
intensely negative reaction from the bench and bar.
135
  Ultimately, 
the resulting White Paper that became law as the Courts and Legal 
Services Act, 1990 “backed away from the more radical proposals 
for reform” and “was a comparatively modest measure.”136  The 
                                                        
133
 For a more detailed discussion of the contents of the Green Papers, see 
WHITE, supra note 117, at 395–398; see also BURRAGE, supra note 117 at 558–
60 (explaining the green papers’ position that the legal field is not entitled to 
self-regulation); see also Michael Zander, The Legal Services Act 2007: An Act 
of Revolution for the Legal Profession, LEGAL SERVICES INSTITUTE 1, 3 (2011)  
(detailing the radical reforms of the green papers).  
134
 See BURRAGE, supra note 117, at 559 (emphasizing the green papers’ 
fundamental arguments). 
135
 See id. at 560–61 (detailing the bar’s public campaign against the green 
papers, which included an extensive advertising campaign, protest meetings, and 
press conferences); see also Judith L. Maute, Revolutionary Changes to the 
English Legal Profession or Much Ado about Nothing? 17 THE PROFESSIONAL 
LAWYER 1, 7 (2006) (discussing the green papers and their negative reception). 
136
 PATON, supra note 132, at 99 (noting that the Courts and Legal Services Act 
of 1990 was a modest effort because it eliminated the more radical proposals 
that were criticized as an apparent intrusion of government onto the English 
legal system). Judith Maute summarizes the changes from Green Papers to the 
White Paper as follows: 
Three months later a new set of White Papers signaled retreat 
from the Government's original radical stance. The 
professional bodies mostly would retain their traditional 
controls prohibiting barrister partnerships, direct access to 
clients, multidisciplinary partnerships, and recognition of 
specialties. Rights of audience remained unchanged for 
practical purposes, but with the understanding that statutory 
bars against solicitors would be repealed. Proposals to allow 
contingency fees were dropped altogether. The professional 
bodies would continue to make the rules of conduct and 
training regarding advocacy and litigation, but they would 
now require approval of the Lord Chancellor. Where the 
Green Papers conferred on the Lord Chancellor strong 
regulatory powers over professional codes of conduct, rights 
of audience and specialization certification, the White Papers 
proposed legislation defining general principles applicable to 
these areas.  They retained some less controversial aspects of 
the Green Papers, such as ending Solicitors' monopoly on 
conveyancing, and creating the Legal Services Ombudsman. 
Both professional branches opposed the White Papers' stance 
on rights of audience; the Law Society bemoaned them as too 
little, and the Bar decried them as too much. (footnotes 
omitted). 
Maute, supra note 135, at 5. 
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act, consisting of 125 sections and spanning 201 pages,
137
 dealt 
with procedure in civil courts,
138
 the regulation of legal services,
139
 
qualification for judicial office,
140
 and the rules governing 
arbitrations.
141
 
 
The Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 also changed the 
courts’ wasted costs jurisdiction.  Section 51 of the Supreme Court 
Act was revised, effective October 1991, and introduced an 
explicit negligence standard: 
 
51(6) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1),
142
 
the court may disallow, or (as the case may be) order the 
legal or other representative concerned to meet, the whole 
of any wasted costs or such part of them as may be 
determined in accordance with rules of court. 
 
51(7) In subsection (6), “wasted costs” means any costs 
incurred by a party— 
(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or 
negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or 
other representative or any employee of such a 
representative; or 
(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission 
occurring after they were incurred, the court 
considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to 
pay.
143
 
                                                        
137
 ROBIN C.A. WHITE, A GUIDE TO THE COURTS AND LEGAL SERVICES ACT 11 
(1991).  
138
 These changes included rule changes relating to the liberalization of rights of 
audience and rules governing evidence.  
139
 Major reforms in this area included extending rights of audience in higher 
courts to solicitors as well as the creation of the Legal Services Ombudsman.  
140
 See ROBIN C.A. WHITE, A GUIDE TO THE COURTS AND LEGAL SERVICES ACT 
15 (1991) (observing that as a result of extending rights of audience and the 
right to conduct litigation, the exclusion of anyone except barristers from higher 
judicial office was no longer considered to be justified; accordingly, the Act 
introduced provisions “[tying] eligibility for judicial appointment to the holding 
for specified periods of time, of an advocacy qualification”). 
141
 Including increased powers given to arbitrators to dismiss claims or counter-
claims in circumstances where there has been “inordinate and inexcusable 
delay.”  
142
 Subsection 1 refers to proceedings in the civil division of the Court of 
Appeal, the High Court and any county court.  
143
 Note that Order 61, rule 11 was amended to supplement the new section 51 
of the Supreme Court Act, but was ultimately replaced by Section 48.7 of the 
Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) in 1999. Section 48.7 of the CPR (which 
remains in force) does not articulate a substantive standard with respect to the 
courts’ exercise of wasted costs jurisdiction, but rather outlines the procedures 
applicable in cases in which the court “is considering whether to make an order 
under section 51(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.” Among the provisions is a 
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The inclusion of the language in section 51(7) referring to “any 
improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission” resolved that 
negligence was sufficient to give rise to a wasted costs order.  The 
reference to “legal or other representatives”144 in Section 51(6) 
extended the court’s wasted costs jurisdiction to barristers in 
addition to solicitors.     
 
 The White Paper, Legal Services: A Framework for the 
Future,
145
 which formed the basis for the legislation, mentions the 
proposed changes to costs orders only very briefly, noting that the 
government was proposing that the “existing rule which enables 
some courts to order that a solicitor should personally bear any part 
of the costs of the an action, where his work has fallen short of the 
standards of competence the court expects” should be extended to 
include all advocates as well as magistrates’ courts.146  In contrast 
to this relative silence in the official literature, there is some 
indication that the legal profession was not happy with the move to 
an explicit negligence standard.  An article published in August 
1990 in the Law Society Gazette reported that “[t]he Law Society 
is furious that the clause has been inserted without proper 
consultation or discussion” and was concerned about a new broad 
and uncertain standard being applied to lawyer conduct under the 
wasted costs jurisdiction.
147
 
 
 The leading case on the application of wasted costs orders 
under section 51 is Ridehalgh v. Horsefield,
148
 in which the Court 
of Appeal in 1994 consolidated six appeals, all addressing the 
                                                                                                                            
requirement that the lawyer be given a reasonable opportunity to attend a 
hearing and dispute the appropriateness of a wasted costs order against him. 
Additional guidance is provided by a Practice Direction that accompanies 
Section 48.7 of the CPR that, among other things, affirms the court’s ability to 
make a wasted costs order on its own initiative. 
144
 The phase “legal or other representatives” is defined in turn in section 51(13) 
of the Supreme Court Act as meaning  “any person exercising a right of 
audience or right to conduct litigation on his behalf.”  
145
See DEPARTMENT OF THE LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR, LEGAL SERVICES: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE 1989, Cm. 749 (U.K) (indicating that the White 
paper formed the basis for the proposed changes regarding wasted costs). 
146
 See id. (describing the past rule which held that an attorney would bear the 
burden of paying for his own services if his services were deemed to fall below 
the expected standard). 
147
 See New Clause Angers Society, LAW SOC. GAZ. (Aug. 22, 1990), 
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/new-clause-angers-society (detailing the Law 
Society’s concern that the new wasted costs direction would create the 
imposition of new and uncertain standards upon lawyer conduct). 
148
 See Ridehalgh, [1994] A.C. at 205 (noting that the decision rules on six 
appeals determining the circumstances under which the court should order one 
party to pay the litigation costs of the opposing party).  
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circumstances in which a wasted costs order should be made.  In 
Ridehalgh, Lord Bingham considered the appropriate interpretation 
of the terms “improper, unreasonable and negligent” as used in 
section 51 of the Supreme Court Act.  Of the three terms, he 
deemed “negligent” as being the “most controversial.”149  In 
considering the meaning of “negligent” in the context of section 
51, Lord Bingham held that “‘negligent’ should be understood in 
an untechnical way to denote failure to act with the competence 
reasonably to be expected of ordinary members of the 
profession.”150  He further clarified that a finding of negligence in 
the context of a wasted costs order did not require a finding that 
there had been “an actionable breach of the legal representative’s 
duty to his own client.”151  Nevertheless, Lord Bingham cautioned 
that an applicant for a wasted costs order under the negligence arm 
of section 51 was required to establish the same elements that a 
plaintiff would be required to establish in an action for 
negligence,
152
 including demonstrating a “causal link” between the 
impugned behavior and the costs that are said to have been wasted. 
 
Lord Bingham also addressed the relationship between the 
doctrine of advocates’ immunity, which had yet to be abolished, 
and the negligence standard articulated in section 51.  After noting 
the apparent incongruity between the common law doctrine and the 
newly established statutory rule, he concluded that “the intention 
of this legislation is to encroach on the traditional immunity of the 
advocate by subjecting him to the wasted costs jurisdiction if he 
causes a waste of costs by improper, unreasonable or negligent 
conduct.”153  Lord Bingham further noted that “[i]t is our belief, 
which we cannot substantiate, that part of the reason underlying 
the changes effected by the new section 51 was judicial concern at 
the wholly unacceptable manner in which a very small minority of 
barristers conducted cases in court.”154 
   In 2003, the House of Lords endorsed the interpretation 
given in Ridehalgh to section 51 in Medcalf v. Mardell.
155
  
Although the allegations in Medcalf involved accusations of 
                                                        
149
 See id. at 232 (interpreting the 1990 Act’s usage of the term). 
150
 See id. at 233 (providing a new interpretation of the term “negligent”). 
151
 See id. at 232 (rejecting the old interpretation). 
152
 For example, an error "such as no reasonably well-informed and competent 
member of that profession could have made.” Id. at 233 (citing Saif Ali v Sydney 
Mitchell & Co. [1980] A.C. 198 at 218, 220) (reminding potential applicants of 
their burden of proof). 
153
 See Ridehalgh, [1994] A.C. at 205, 236.  
154
 See id. (explaining that the intention of the legislation is to limit the 
traditional immunity of the advocate if the advocate causes a waste by improper 
conduct). 
155
 See Medcalf v. Mardell, [2003] 1 A.C. 120 (expanding the scope of the 
wasted costs doctrine to cover the factual situation present). 
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intentional misconduct and not negligence, Lord Hobhouse 
discussed the use of the term “negligence” at some length, 
commenting that: 
 
The word negligent raises additional problems of 
interpretation….[I]t would appear that the inclusion 
of the word negligent in substitution for "reasonable 
competence", is directed primarily to the 
jurisdiction as between a legal representative and 
his own client. It is possible to visualise situations 
where the negligence of an advocate might justify 
the making of a wasted costs order which included 
both parties, such as where an advocate fails to turn 
up on an adjourned hearing so that a hearing date is 
lost. The breach of the advocate's duty to the court 
will be clear and if the breach was not deliberate, 
the term negligent would best describe it.
156
  
 
Insofar as Lord Hobhouse states that the term “negligent” in the 
statute is “directed primarily to the jurisdiction as between a legal 
representative and his own client,” he departs from the general 
tenor of past judicial interpretation which articulated the wasted 
cost jurisdiction as focused on the duty owed by the lawyer to the 
court and as not being predicated upon “an actionable breach of the 
legal representative's duty to his own client.”157  
 
 In the first decade following the introduction of a 
negligence standard in section 51, approximately 75 cases applying 
the section were reported.
158
  Among the circumstances in which 
the English courts have made wasted cost orders are cases in which 
the lawyer:  pursued a misconceived appeal against an arbitrator’s 
decision;
159
 failed to realize that an attempt to wind up a company 
                                                        
156
 See id. at 143 (opining that negligence is a theory of liability that exists in the 
advocate-client relationship). 
157
 For example, in Ridehalgh, Lord Bingham held that a wasted costs order 
under section 51’s negligence arm was not dependent on the finding that a 
lawyer breached a duty to this client and, indeed, “since the applicant's right to a 
wasted costs order against a legal representative depends on showing that the 
latter is in breach of his duty to the court it makes no sense to superimpose a 
requirement under this head (but not in the case of impropriety or 
unreasonableness) that he is also in breach of his duty to his client.” See also 
Myers v. Elman [1940] AC 282, 291 (Lord Maugham as articulating the 
operative duty as a “duty to the court”).  
158
 See EVANS, supra note 129 at 127 n.6.  
159
 See Fletamentos Maritimos SA v. Effjohn Int’l SA, [2003] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 
26 (criticizing the lawyer’s appeal and ordering a wasted cost penalty). 
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was inappropriate;
160
 failed to disclose to the Court in an 
application for a Mareva injunction that the client was in fact 
bankrupt;
161
 issued proceedings to commit for a breach of an 
undertaking without warning, in circumstances where the breach at 
issue was merely technical;
162
 and failed to attend an appeal 
because of wrong information given to the lawyer by the lawyer’s 
clerk.
163
  The scope of the English courts’ jurisdiction under 
section 51 is broader that of the American courts’ under Rule 11 
because the later provision is limited to misconduct in relation to 
the filing of litigation papers and does not extend to misconduct in 
the course of litigation generally. 
 
D. English Safeguards:  An Exception for Hopeless Cases 
 
Although they endorsed a “plain meaning” interpretation of 
the negligence arm of section 51, the courts in Ridehalgh and 
Medcalf each expressed concern about certain tensions that they 
viewed to be inherent in the wasted costs jurisdiction.  In 
Ridehalgh, the Court of Appeal identified a tension arising 
between the public interest inhering in lawyers not being “deterred 
from pursuing their clients' interests by fear of incurring a personal 
liability to their clients' opponents”164 and “the other public 
interest…that litigants should not be financially prejudiced by the 
unjustifiable conduct of litigation by their or their opponents' 
lawyers.”165  The House of Lords in Medcalf noted a different 
tension in the form of a “risk of a conflict of interest for the 
                                                        
160
 See Re a Company (No. 0022 of 1993), [1993] B.C.C. 726 (1993) (holding 
that the company’s solicitors should be subject to a wasted cost order for 
inappropriately attempting to wind up the company). 
161
 See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. de Montenegro, [1994] N.P.C. 46 (1994) 
(finding that the attorney’s failure to disclose pertinent information warranted a 
wasted cost order). 
162
 See R. v. Liverpool City Council, [1994] C.O.D. 144 (1993) (penalizing the 
solicitors with a wasted cost order for bringing an action based on a technical 
breach). 
163
 See R. v. Rodney, [1997] P.N.L.R. 489, 489-90 (1996) (ordering a wasted 
cost penalty to be levied upon the lawyer for the failure to attend an appeal 
proceeding). 
164
 See Ridehalgh, [1994] A.C. at 205 at 226. The Court of Appeal noted three 
additional interests for lawyers: “that [lawyers] should not be penalised by 
orders to pay costs without a fair opportunity to defend themselves; that wasted 
costs orders should not become a back-door means of recovering costs not 
otherwise recoverable against a legally-aided or impoverished litigant; and that 
the remedy should not grow unchecked to become more damaging than the 
disease.” 
165
 See id. at 226 (noting that although lawyers should pursue their clients’ 
interests without fear of personal liability, there is also an interest in protecting 
litigants from wasted costs). 
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advocate” between his or her duties to a client and to the court.166  
As observed by Lord Hobhouse, “ideally a conflict should not 
arise” because “[t]he advocate's duty to his own client is subject to 
his duty to the court: the advocate's proper discharge of his duty to 
his client should not cause him to be accused of being in breach of 
his duty to the court.”167 Notwithstanding this “ideal” congruence, 
Lord Hobhouse expressed concern that the circumstances in which 
a lawyer may, in fact, find himself or herself in litigation will not 
always be “so clear-cut”: 
 
Difficult tactical decisions may have to be made, 
maybe in difficult circumstances. Opinions can 
differ, particularly in the heated and stressed arena 
of litigation. Once an opposing party is entitled to 
apply for an order against the other party's legal 
representatives, the situation becomes much more 
unpredictable and hazardous for the advocate. 
Adversarial perceptions are introduced. . . . The 
factors which may motivate a hostile application by 
an opponent are liable to be very different from 
those which would properly motivate a court.
168
 
 
The English courts have introduced one major substantive 
safeguard to the “negligence” arm of the wasted costs jurisdiction 
through an exception for “hopeless cases.”  In Ridehalgh, the 
English Court of Appeal considered the issue of “hopeless cases” 
and held that “[a] legal representative is not to be held to have 
acted improperly, unreasonably, or negligently simply because he 
acts for a party who pursues a claim or a defence which is plainly 
doomed to fail.”169  The House of Lords echoed this sentiment in 
Medcalf, commenting that “it is not enough that the court considers 
that the advocate has been arguing a hopeless case” and that “to 
penalise the advocate for presenting his client's case to the court 
would be contrary to . . . constitutional principles.”170  Although 
there has been some disagreement in the case law at to whether this 
judicially created exception for “hopeless cases” requires 
“something more than negligence for the wasted costs jurisdiction 
                                                        
166
 See Medcalf, [2003] 1 A.C. at 142 (detailing how the wasted costs 
jurisdiction affects lawyers’ duties).  
167
 See id. (examining why conflicts should not arise for lawyers in most 
circumstances). 
168
 See id (noting the situations in which a lawyer’s duties to the client and court 
are not aligned). 
169
 See Ridehalgh, [1994] A.C. at 233 (explaining that reproaching barristers for 
representing clients who pursue hopeless cases may have the negative effect of 
limiting reputable representation for those clients). 
170
 See Medcalf, [2003] 1 A.C. 120 at 143 (Eng.) (stating that it is the duty of 
advocates to present their clients’ cases, even if they are hopeless). 
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to arise” in the form of a finding of an abuse of process, this 
dispute appears to have resolved itself in favor of continuing with 
the “plain meaning” interpretation given to the term “negligent” in 
Ridehalgh.
171
  
 
Notwithstanding the safeguard introduced through the 
judicial exception for “hopeless cases,” several English 
commentators have expressed concern about the exercise of the 
courts’ wasted costs jurisdiction under section 51.  Hugh Evans has 
argued that “in both practice and principle, the wasted costs 
jurisdiction is seriously flawed.”172  One of Evans’ complaints is 
that the cost of a wasted costs application is often far more than the 
actual wasted costs at stake.
173
  Having surveyed the case law up to 
                                                        
171
 In Persaud v. Persaud, [2003], EWCA (Civ) 394 [26]–[27] (Eng.), the Court 
of Appeal reviewed the comments of the courts with respect to the pursuit of 
hopeless cases in Ridehalgh and Medcalf and accepted the submission of 
counsel for the respondents “that there must be something more than negligence 
for the wasted costs jurisdiction to arise: there must be something akin to an 
abuse of process if the conduct of the legal representative is to make him liable 
to a wasted costs order.”   However, soon after Persaud, the Court of Appeal 
stepped back from these comments in the case of Dempsey v. Johnstone, [2003] 
EWCA (Civ) 1134 (Eng.).  In Dempsey, Latham L.J. concluded that Ridehalgh 
and Medcalf could not be viewed reasonably as modifying the understanding of 
the term “negligent” articulated in Ridehalgh, although Latham L.J. 
acknowledged that finding that a legal representative was negligent, and thereby 
acted unreasonably was “akin to establishing an abuse of process.”  See 
Dempsey, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1134 [28] (Eng.).  In general, courts in 
subsequent cases have chosen to follow the approach in Dempsey as opposed to 
following a strict reading of the comments in Persaud that negligent conduct is 
not sufficient for the court’s wasted costs jurisdiction to arise.  See, e.g., Morris 
v. Roberts [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1040 [52] (Eng.) (observing that “a legal 
representative will also be liable to a wasted costs order if, exercising the 
objective professional judgment of a reasonably competent solicitor, he ought 
reasonably to have appreciated that the litigation in which he was acting, 
constituted an abuse of process” and noting that the “stricter test” set out in 
Persaud “is no longer the law”); see also Isaacs P’ship v. Umm Al-Jawaby Oil 
Serv. Co. Ltd., [2003] EWHC (QB) 2539 [25] (Eng.) (noting that “the 
authorities do not warrant the conclusion that ‘negligence’ on its own is 
insufficient for the making of a wasted costs order”); see also Hedrich v. 
Standard Bank London Ltd., [2007] EWHC (QB) 1656 [12] (Eng.) (agreeing 
with the approach taken in Morris to adopt the approach in Demspey as opposed 
to Persaud). But see, Patel v. Air India Ltd., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 443 [15] 
(Eng.) (stating that in order to attract the courts’ wasted costs jurisdiction, “not 
only must the claim be hopeless but there must be a breach of duty to the court, 
that being a breach by the solicitors of their duty to the court . . . or, as it has 
been put in other authorities such as Persaud v Persaud [2003] EWCA Civ 394, 
there must be something akin to an abuse of the process of the court”). 
172
 See HUGH EVANS, LAWYERS’ LIABILITIES 127 (2d ed. 2002) (exploring the 
defects of the wasted costs jurisdiction through analysis of reported cases 
affected by the jurisdiction).  
173
 See id at 128–32 (2d ed. 2002) (analyzing specific cases which exhibit the 
exorbitant cost of wasted cost applications). 
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2002, he reports that he “found no reported case where it is clear 
that the costs incurred in the wasted costs application were justified 
by the amount of wasted costs sought or recovered.”174 Adrian 
Zuckerman has echoed Evans’ concern, commenting that “the 
jurisdiction has given rise to a new type of satellite litigation, 
which can be expensive and wholly out of proportion to the costs 
that can be recovered from the lawyer or, indeed, to the costs of the 
substantive proceedings.”175   
 
III. CANADA 
 
In Canada, as in the United States and England, the courts 
possess an inherent jurisdiction as well as statutory authority to 
require lawyers to pay personally the costs of an opposing party.
176
  
As in the United States and England, the law in Canada has moved 
towards the adoption of a negligence standard in recent decades 
and has employed various statutory and judicial safeguards to 
temper the effect of this standard. 
 
A. The Canadian Courts’ Inherent Jurisdiction 
 
Historically, Canadian courts explicitly followed the House 
of Lords’ 1940 decision in Myers v. Elman in cases concerning the 
courts’ inherent jurisdiction to require a lawyer to pay personally 
the litigation costs of an opposing party.
177
 However, in the 1993 
                                                        
174
 See id at 129 (2d ed. 2002) One example given by Evans is the case of Re a 
Company (No. 006798 of 1995) [1996] 1 W.L.R. 491 wherein a petition to wind 
up a company was struck out within a day, but the subsequent petition and 
application for wasted costs from the solicitor who swore the affidavit in support 
of the petition “appears to have taken all or part of four days”. 
175
 See ADRIAN A.S. ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 966 (2003).  
176
 See Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3. (Can.) (explaining that Canadian 
courts have authority under statute and their inherent jurisdiction to award costs 
to the successful party); see, e.g., MANITOBA LAW REFORM COMM’N, COSTS 
AWARDS IN CIVIL LITIG. REPORT #111 8 (2005), 
http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/mlrc/reports/111.pdf (discussing that in the 
Canadian province of Manitoba, the court has the discretion to award the 
successful party costs against the unsuccessful party). 
177
 See Paul Perell, Ordering a Solicitor Personally to Pay Costs, 25 ADVOC. Q. 
103, 104 (2001). See, for example, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s comments in 
Re Ontario Crime Commission, [1962] O.R. 872 (Can.) whereby the court 
ordered a lawyer to personally pay costs where he had knowingly filed a false 
affidavit of a client.  In so ordering, the court held: 
It is no answer for counsel to say that he was merely carrying 
out his client’s instructions.  If the instructions are to do that 
which is wrong, counsel is abetting the wrong if he carries out 
the instructions.  If he knows that his client is making false 
statements under oath and does nothing to correct it his silence 
indicates, at the very least, a gross neglect of duty.  Regardless 
of any other sanctions which may be imposed upon him, there 
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decision of Young v. Young,
178
 the Supreme Court of Canada 
departed from this tradition to some extent.  Writing for the 
majority on this issue, Justice McLachlin (as she then was) 
considered the authority of the court to order a lawyer to pay costs 
personally and held that “[a]ny member of the legal profession 
might be subject to a compensatory order for costs if it is shown 
that repetitive and irrelevant material, and excessive motions and 
applications, characterized the proceedings in which [they] were 
involved, and that the lawyer acted in bad faith in encouraging this 
abuse and delay.”179  Although the Supreme Court made no 
reference to Myers v. Elman in this case, the Court did approve of 
the lower court’s conclusion that the conduct of the lawyer in 
question had not been sufficiently egregious to justify an award of 
costs against him.   In reaching this conclusion, the lower court had 
relied on Myers v. Elman and had discussed the House of Lord’s 
comments in that case at some length.   Justice McLachlin’s 
reference to a lawyer having “acted in bad faith,” however, 
suggested a departure from Myers v. Elman standard under which 
only “gross negligence” or a “serious dereliction of duty” is 
                                                                                                                            
will be an order that counsel for the applicant personally pay 
the costs of all other parties appearing on this motion.  Such an 
order may be exceptional but in our view is justified by the 
circumstances outlined.  In Myers v. Elman, [1940] A.C. 282, 
Lord Wright discussed the principles for the making of the 
order as to costs which has just been made…. 
Following this passage, the court proceeded to quote from Lord Wright’s speech 
in Myers v. Elman including his statement that “a mere mistake or error of 
judgment is not generally sufficient [for the court’s exercise of its inherent 
disciplinary authority], but a gross neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a 
solicitor's duty to ascertain with accuracy may suffice.”  A number of other 
Canadian courts have also explicitly relied on Myers v. Elman as support for the 
authority that the court has the inherent jurisdiction to order lawyers to 
personally pay costs. See, e.g., Boland Foundation v. Moog, [1963] O.J. No. 314 
(C.A.); Re: Fisher and the Queen, (1977) 78 D.L.R. (3d) 215 (Fed. C.A.); 
Pacific Mobile Corp. v. Hunter Douglas Ltd., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 842; Blair v. 
Levesque, (1990) 108 N.B.R. (2d) 171; Perley v. Sypher, (1990) 109 N.B.R. 
(2d) 427 (N.B. C.A.); First National Bank of Oregon v. Watson (A.H.) Ranching 
Ltd., 1984 A.R. LEXIS 3761 (Alta. Q.B. 1984); Petten et al. v. E.Y.E. Marine 
Consultants et al., 1998 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. LEXIS 441 (Nfld. S.C. 1998); Blair v. 
Ouellette et al. (1990), 108 N.B.R.(2d) 171; Royal Bank of Canada v. 
Kwiatkowski et al., 1989 Sask. R. LEXIS 822 (Sask. Q.B. 1989). Notably, the 
Supreme Court of Canada directly approved of Myers v. Elman in its brief 
judgment in Pacific Mobile Corp. v. Hunter Douglas Canada Ltd. [1979] 1 
S.C.R. 842, stating that in the circumstances of the case, “the Court should make 
use of its power to order costs payable by solicitors personally, in accordance 
with principles which were fully stated by the House of Lords in Myers v. 
Elman, and need not be restated here.”  
178
 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3. (Can.). 
179
 See Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, 17 (Can.) [hereinafter Young] 
(ruling that no order of costs should have been made against respondent’s 
attorney). 
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required.  The issue of whether Justice McLachlin intended to 
depart from Myers v. Elman in Young v. Young does not appear to 
be the subject of any discussion in subsequent case law or in the 
academic literature.  Following Young v. Young, a number of 
Canadian courts cited Justice McLachlin’s comments as having 
established the proposition that the exercise of the courts’ inherent 
jurisdiction to award costs against lawyers personally did require a 
finding of “bad faith.”180  In any event, as in the United States and 
England, Canadian courts now generally order costs against 
lawyers personally on the basis of statutory provisions rather than 
on the basis of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction. 
 
B. Ontario’s Introduction of a Negligence Standard 
 
 In Canada, provincial legislatures have jurisdiction over the 
administration of civil justice and, accordingly, rules of civil 
procedure are established on a provincial basis.  In what follows, I 
examine the statutory developments in one Canadian jurisdiction, 
Ontario.  The first relevant statutory provision in Ontario was 
introduced in 1985 as part of comprehensive reforms to Ontario’s 
Civil Procedure rules.
181
  Although “a key objective of the reforms 
was to ensure full, early disclosure of facts and evidence in order 
to identify the contentious issues in a lawsuit and to promote 
settlement,”182 the reforms introduced changes to a wide range of 
civil procedure rules including provisions addressing the costs of 
litigation.
183
   
 
                                                        
180
 See Schwisberg v. Krieger & Assocs. (1997) 33 O.R. 3d 256 (Can. Ont. 
C.A.); see also Marchand v. Pub. Gen. Hosp. Soc’y of Chatham [1998] O.J. No. 
527 at para. 179 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) (opining that an award for costs does not 
require a finding of bad faith); see also Markdale Ltd. v. Ducharme (1998) 238 
A.R. 98 (Alta. Q.B.). More recently, in R. v. Cunningham [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331, 
350 (Can.) the Supreme Court of Canada made reference to a bad faith standard 
being established in Young, [1993] 4 S. C. R. 3. (Can.) noting in passing that 
“McLachlin J. in Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 135-36, 
acknowledged that a court can award costs against counsel personally in rare 
cases where counsel acts in bad faith by encouraging abuse and delay of the 
court's process.” 
181
 The reforms, contained in the newly promulgated Rules of Civil Procedure, 
were drafted by a Rules Committee created by statute and subject to legislative 
approval before coming into force. 
182
 See MINISTRY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON THE TASK FORCE ON 
DISCOVERY PROCESS (2003), available at 
http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/en/reports/discoveryreview/ 
executivesummary.htm (listing objectives of reforms to the Rules). 
183
 See generally John Morden, An Overview of the Rules of Civil Procedure of 
Ontario, 5 ADVOC. Q. 257, 259–61 (1984) (reviewing all of the procedural 
provisions introduced by the Rules). 
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In particular, the newly introduced Rule 57.07 explicitly 
provided that a lawyer could be personally liable for costs in 
certain circumstances.  As introduced in 1985, Rule 57.07 read: 
 
57.07  (1) Where a solicitor for a party has caused 
costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to 
be wasted by undue delay, negligence or other 
default, the court may make an order, 
(a) disallowing costs between the solicitor 
and client or directing the solicitor to repay 
to the client money paid on account of costs; 
(b) directing the solicitor to reimburse the 
client for any costs that the client has been 
ordered to pay to any other party; and 
(c) requiring the solicitor to personally to 
pay the costs of any party.  
(2)  An order under subrule (1) may be made by the 
court on its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party to the proceeding, but no such order shall be 
made unless the solicitor is given a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations to the court.  
(3)  The court may direct that notice of an order 
against a solicitor under subrule (1) be given to the 
client in the manner specified in the order.  
 
The term “lawyer” replaced the term “solicitor” in the rule as part 
of an omnibus change in terminology in the Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 2007.    
 
At the time of its introduction, Rule 57.07 was “entirely 
new”184 and members of the profession expressed concern about its 
potential effects.
185
  Within weeks of Rule 57.07 coming into 
                                                        
184
 See David W. Scott, Costs and the Rules of Civil Procedure, in NEW RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12-2 (1984). Note that, under the previous rules that were 
in place, the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Supreme Court of Ontario, 
there were certain circumstances under which lawyers might be held personally 
accountable for costs notwithstanding the fact that the rules did not make 
specific provisions for this to happen.  See United Van Lines Ltd. v. Petrov, 
[1975] 13 O.R. 2d 479 (providing an example where costs against a lawyer were 
awarded by courts where a lawyer certified a clearly frivolous claim under Rule 
33(4), which authorized the special endorsement of writs of summons with a 
statement of claim where the plaintiff had sought to recover a debt or a 
liquidated demand in money). 
185
 The comments of David W. Scott, a senior practitioner in Ontario, reflect a 
number of the profession’s concerns at the time: 
The somewhat troubling area [of the new changes to the civil 
procedure rules], insofar as this practitioner is concerned, 
flows from the recent history of the relationship between 
Bench and Bar in Ontario as the threshold against which the 
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force, one Ontario lawyer brought an application for a declaration 
that the rule was of no force and effect on several grounds, 
including the rule’s purported attack on the independence of the 
bar as well as the rule’s alleged violation of certain constitutional 
                                                                                                                            
provisions of Rule 57.07 were developed.  The preoccupation 
of the Courts with the management of “its” caseload in terms 
of the expeditious resolution of disputes has resulted in a 
tendancy [sic], from time to time, to transfer to counsel 
involved the responsibility for what are perceived as 
unnecessary proceedings, delays or prolongation of trials.  As 
counsel, one has the temerity to think that, from time to time, 
Her Majesty’s Judges are somewhat forgetful of the 
responsibility for, and the process of dealing with, litigants 
determined to enforce their rights in increasingly complex 
matters.  It would be well to remind ourselves of the 
demanding obligation which counsel has to his or her client.  
The Rules of Professional Conduct in Ontario include the 
principle generally accepted in England that: 
“a Barrister has a duty to his client fearlessly 
to raise every issue, advance every argument 
and ask every question, however distasteful, 
which he properly may and which he thinks 
will help his client’s case, without regard to 
any unpleasant consequences to himself or 
any other person” (emphasis added) 
(Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Ed., Vol. 
3,  ¶1137) 
While this obligation is coupled with an overriding duty to the 
Court and to the public it is of such significance to the overall 
administration of justice that, within appropriately defined 
limits, counsel must be able to approach this responsibility 
with singlemindededness… 
 
The fact that a significant portion of the relief encompassed by Rule 
57.07 was available in the ordinary exercise of the Court’s 
extraordinary discretion is beside the point.  The codification of this 
relief is, I would suggest, ominous.   It is not a rule which will give 
much pause to the experienced practitioner.  The inexperienced 
members of the Bar are another matter.  How many times have we all, 
in our developing years, agonized over claims to make, issues to raise, 
lines of questioning to develop, as part of our responsibilities to our 
clients in the framework of our roles as officers of the Court?  Will this 
process, in the hands of the young lawyer, be encouraged to the 
advantage of the client if the sword of Rule 57.07 hangs over counsel’s 
head as a backdrop against which the strategy of presenting the client’s 
case is developed.  It is not unlikely that codification and expansion of 
this drastic remedy may serve to intimidate the responsible lawyer 
more than the reverse.  
 
(Scott, supra note 184 at 12-8 to 12-9). 
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rights.
186
  This application ultimately made its way to the Supreme 
Court of Canada, which upheld a lower court’s decision to quash 
the application on the basis that the applicant had failed to put 
forward any evidence that the impugned rules violated provisions 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
187
  The hostility 
to Rule 57.07 among the legal profession is reflected in the 
Supreme Court’s decision:  Justice Sopinka noted in the opening 
paragraph of his reasons that Rule 57.07 was “known colloquially 
among the Ontario Bar as the “Torquemada Rule,” referencing 
“the first grand inquisitor of the Spanish Inquisition whose name 
has become synonymous with cruelty.”188 
 
C. Initial Resistance to a Negligence Standard 
 
Notwithstanding the explicit negligence standard in Rule 
57.07, courts were initially divided over the question of whether 
more than “mere negligence” was required before an order of costs 
against a lawyer could be made under the provision.  One line of 
authority viewed the rule as codifying the doctrine in Myers v. 
Elman requiring serious misconduct (and thereby precluding an 
order for cases of “mere negligence”).  A contrasting line of 
authority advocated for a plain reading of the rule’s language and 
awarded costs against lawyers where lawyers had been found to 
have ‘caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or to be 
wasted by undue delay, negligence or other default.’189  
Exemplifying the first line of authority, Justice Sutherland held in 
the 1987 case of Cini v. Micaleff
190
 that “[a]lthough rule 57.07 is 
worded in such a way as to make it appear that it would be 
applicable as a compensatory matter in cases of mere negligence, it 
is clear that the thrust of the decided cases is such that something 
more than mere negligence is required.”191  On this basis, Justice 
Sutherland declined to award costs against the lawyers who had 
added a corporate plaintiff to an action at the opening of trial 
despite the fact that, unknown to the lawyers, the corporate 
plaintiff had been dissolved and, as such, could not have 
authorized the claim in its name.  Following Cini v. Micaleff, a 
                                                        
186
 See Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General) [1985], 51 O.R. 2d 405 (Can. Ont., 
H.C.J.) (discussing whether a lawyer had standing to challenge legislation which 
imposed penalties on lawyers filing frivolous lawsuits). 
187
 See Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086 (Can.) 
(explaining that a solicitor will be responsible for costs when they cause costs to be 
incurred without reasonable cause or wasted by undue delay, negligence or other 
default). 
188
 See id. (emphasizing that many lawyers felt that new civil procedure rules 
assessing costs against lawyers in certain circumstances were cruel). 
189
 Perell, supra note 177 at 105. 
190
 (1987), 60 O.R. (2d ) 584 (H.C.J.).  
191
 Id. at 609.  
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number of other cases in Ontario held that conduct on the part of 
the lawyer needed to amount to something more than “mere 
negligence” before costs will be awarded under Rule 57.07.192  A 
division in the case law emerged, however, when Justice Haines in 
the 1994 case of Worsley v. Lichong
193
 rejected the proposition 
articulated in Cini v. Micaleff that more than “mere negligence” 
was required and instead held that the “straightforward” language 
in the rule should be given its “ordinary meaning.”194  
 
The division in the case law that had emerged was 
considered at length by Justice Granger in Marchand v. Public 
General Hospital Society of Chatham.
195
  After reviewing both the 
Canadian and English authorities on the issue of awarding costs 
against lawyers personally, Justice Granger concluded that Rule 
57.07 was a codification of the common law and that the “ordinary 
meaning of the words contained therein can be applied to 
determine if an order for costs should be made against the solicitor 
personally.”196  Justice Granger further held that “mere negligence 
can attract cost consequences” as can “actions or omissions which 
fall short of negligence.”197 For example, cases in which “bad 
judgment” does not amount to negligence yet causes undue delay 
in trial.198 Notwithstanding these statements of Justice Granger, 
Ontario courts were initially split following Marchand on the issue 
of whether serious misconduct or bad faith was required before a 
costs order could be granted against a lawyer under Rule 57.07.
199
   
Recent cases, however, reflect a general acceptance of interpreting 
Rule 57.07 in accordance with its  “ordinary meaning.”200  For 
                                                        
192
 See, e.g., 931473 Ontario Ltd. v. Coldwell Banker Canada Inc. (1992), 5 
C.P.C.(3d) 271 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Drosos v. Chong, [1992] O.J. No. 520; 8 
C.P.C.(3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Bubbar v. Fabian, [1991] O.J. No. 813; 
Grenier v. Southam Inc., [1993] O.J. No. 1559 (Gen. Div.); Aitken v. Aitken, 
[1993] O.J. No. 2326 (Prov. Div.).  
193
 [1994] 17 O.R. 3d 615 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.).  
194
 See id. (stressing that rule 57.07 expressly provides for certain cost 
consequences). 
 
195
 [1996] O.J. No. 4420 (Gen. Div.) 
196
 Id. at para. 122. 
197
 See id.  
198
 See id.  
199
 See Perell, supra note 177 at 112–14 (2001-2002) (discussing split among 
Canadian courts as to whether bad faith was a strict requirement to award costs 
against a solicitor).  
200
 Notably, in Walsh v. 1124660 Ontario Ltd., [2002] O.J. No. 4069, para. 33 
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), Justice Sutherland strayed from the position that he took 
in Cini v. Micallef, [1987] 60 O.R. 2d 584 (Can. H.C.J.), stating: “[a]lthough I 
continue to believe that my decision in Cini v. Micallef (1987), 60 O.R. (2d) 
584, arrived at the correct result on the facts of that case, I take this opportunity 
to state that I now believe that I was wrong when I stated that despite the 
wording of rule 57.07, the court should not award costs personally against a 
solicitor except in cases of gross negligence or where the conduct of the solicitor 
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example, in McDonald v. Standard Life Assurance Co.,
201
 Justice 
Quinn states:  
 
Rule 57.07(1) speaks of costs being "incurred 
without reasonable cause" or being "wasted by ... 
negligence or other default." . . . That is sufficient. 
There is no need to layer rule 57.07(1) with notions 
of "gross negligence," "inexcusable" or "outrageous 
conduct," "conduct meriting reproof" or similar 
language. Such terms describe conduct that goes 
beyond what is needed to satisfy rule 57.07(1). The 
wording of rule 57.07(1) is clear and simply put 
and, in the end, it does not pose a very high or 
onerous threshold.
202
 
 
In Galganov v. Russell (Township),
203
 the Ontario Court of Appeal 
has recently confirmed that the appropriate standard to be applied 
under Rule 57.07 is as set out in Marchand and that “mere 
negligence can attract costs consequences in addition to actions or 
omissions which fall short of negligence.”204 It is clear that a 
negligence standard now prevails in Ontario as in the United States 
and England. 
 
D. Safeguards Introduced by Courts 
 
                                                                                                                            
is inexcusable and such as to merit reproof.”  Other cases adopting an “ordinary 
meaning” approach include Standard Life Assurance Co. v. Elliott, [2007] O.J. 
No. 2031, para. 25 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), Rand Estate v. Lenton, [2007] O.J. 
No. 831 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.), McDonald v. Standard Life Assurance Co., [2007] 
O.J. No. 2334 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.), and Pineau v. Kretschmar Inc., [2004] O.J. 
No. 3239 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).  That said, some confusion still persists in the 
case law.  Cases expressing uncertainty as to the appropriate standard or 
departing from an “ordinary meaning” approach include Przybysz v. Przybysz, 
[2005] O.J. No. 3131 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (citing Cini v. Micallef for the 
proposition that something more than mere negligence is required on the part of 
counsel before the court will order costs against a solicitor personally), Bennett 
v. 1377360 Ontario Corp. (c.o.b. Thyssen Elevator), [2004] O.J. No. 5240, para. 
49 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (citing “an apparent conflict” in the case law as to 
whether bad faith is required), Gentles v. Francis, [2009] CanLII 4854, para. 7 
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (commenting that “some Courts have interpreted Young 
to require a finding of bad faith before a costs order against a counsel personally 
will be appropriate” but noting that “even if a finding of bad faith is not 
necessary to warrant an order under Rule 57.07, the wording is discretionary, 
not mandatory.”), and Martin v. Mazza, [2009] CanLII 44723 (Can. Ont. Sup. 
Ct. J.) (applying a standard of serious misconduct). 
201
 [2007] O.J. No. 2334 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
202
 Id. at para. 37. 
203
 2012 ONCA 410 (Can. Ont. C.A.) 
204
 Id. at para. 18. 
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Although courts now generally accept that an order under 
Rule 57.07 requires only a finding of negligence and not a finding 
of bad faith, judges have expressed anxiety regarding the potential 
overbreadth of the negligence standard.  In Young v. Young, Justice 
McLachlin had cautioned—albeit in the context of the courts’ 
inherent jurisdiction—that “[a] lawyer should not be placed in a 
situation where his or her fear of an adverse order of costs may 
conflict with these fundamental duties of his or her profession.”205  
Speaking directly to Rule 57.07, Justice Quinn similarly noted in 
McDonald v. Standard Life Assurance Company that a lawyer 
“should not face liability under rule 57.01(1) [sic] ‘in representing 
a client in respect of an issue possessing little merit simply on the 
basis that the issue had little merit’ and that ‘lawyers should not be 
afraid to take on, and fearlessly argue, weak issues.’”206   
 
In view of these concerns, the courts have sought to temper 
the effect of interpreting Rule 57.07 in accordance with its 
“ordinary meaning” in several ways.  Several decisions have 
emphasized Justice Granger’s statements in Marchand that orders 
under Rule 57.07 “should only be made in rare circumstances” and 
that “it is only when a lawyer pursues a goal which is clearly 
unattainable or is clearly derelict in his or her duties as an officer 
of the court that resort should be had to rule 57.07.”207  Justice 
McLachlin’s admonition in Young v. Young that “courts must be 
extremely cautious in awarding costs personally against a 
lawyer”208 has also been reiterated a number of times.209  
Moreover, the caution urged by the courts in the application of 
Rule 57.07 has been formalized in a judicially created two-part 
test.  In deciding whether or not to make an order against a lawyer 
under Rule 57.07, the court must first determine “whether the 
particular conduct complained of falls within the purview of the 
rule” and, if the conduct does fall under the rule, the court must 
                                                        
205
 See [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3. (Can.) (warning against the dangers of allowing 
personal costs to be brought against an attorney). 
206
 See [2007] O.J. No. 2334, para. 38 (Can. Ont.) (quoting Belanger v. 
McGrade Estate).  
207
 See Marchand [1998] O.J. No. 527 at para. 179 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) 
(describing the limited circumstances where rule 57.07 should be applied). 
208
 See [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3. (Can.) (explaining that the zealous representation 
expected of an attorney should lead courts to be hesitant to award personal costs 
against a lawyer). 
209
 See, e.g., Schreiber v. Mulroney, [2007] O.J. No. 3191, para. 28 (Can. Ont.) 
(recognizing the standard in Marchand, but still awarding costs against the 
lawyer given “egregious” and “wrong” conduct); see also, Carleton v. Beaverton 
Hotel, [2009] 96 O.R. (3d) 391, 397 (Can. Ont.) (setting aside a lower court’s 
decision to award costs against a lawyer personally, in part because the lower 
court’s reasoning did not reflect an application of the "extreme caution" 
principle).  
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then decide “whether the circumstances are such that the 
provisions of the rule should be invoked.”210  In deciding whether 
the provisions of the rule should be invoked, the court is required 
to use its discretion and exercise “extreme caution” before 
deciding whether a costs order should issue.
211
  Most recently, in 
Galganov, the Ontario Court of Appeal reiterated the need for 
caution and noted that “[t]he rule was not intended to allow the 
frustration of the opposing party’s counsel to be taken out against a 
counsel personally because he or she went down a series of blind 
alleys with his or her clients’ instructions or approval.”212  
 
The particular cases in which Ontario courts have ordered 
costs against lawyers personally are diverse.  Costs orders have 
been made “for failing to take instructions from a client; failing to 
appear at a hearing; failing to remove [oneself] from the record 
properly; mishandling an action and misleading the client; 
instituting proceedings which were ill-conceived and without 
merit; unreasonably and negligently causing costs to be wasted; 
being responsible for intolerable delay; commencing an action to 
circumvent a pending action; engaging in abusive conduct or 
loquacious and repetitious interference with an examination for 
discovery so that it was aborted; swearing a false and misleading 
affidavit by an articled student; failing to disclose that the 
defendant was bankrupt; and being responsible for unfounded 
allegations of undue influence which impugned the integrity and 
good faith of an executor.”213   
 
Although the courts’ statutory jurisdiction to award costs 
against lawyers personally has given rise to some concerns on the 
part of courts as to potential overbreadth, the introduction of Rule 
57.07 has not given rise to any significant controversy in Canada.  
Although substantial amendments were made to Ontario’s Rules of 
Civil Procedure in 2010 as a result of a comprehensive review of 
the province’s civil justice system, no amendments were suggested 
                                                        
210
 See Marchand, [1998] O.J. No. 527 at para. 122 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) 
(adopting test set out by Justice Haines in Worsley v. Lichong (1994) 17 O.R. 3d 
615 (Can. Gen. Div.)).  
211
 See Carmichael v. Stathshore Indus. Park Ltd. (1999), 121 O.A.C. 289, para. 
15 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (recognizing that extreme caution must be exercised when 
determining whether to award costs personally against a solicitor); see also 
Carleton v. Beaverton Hotel (2009), 96 O.R. 3d 391, para. 15 (Can. Ont. Sup. 
Ct. J.) (reasoning that Rule 57.07 should only be applied to award costs against a 
solicitor sparingly); see also A and B Auto Leasing & Car Rental Inc. v. 
Mississauga Auto Clinic Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 4670, para. 32 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. 
J.) (stating the second step of the inquiry into whether rule 57.07 requires courts 
to apply the extreme caution principle).  
212
 See 2012 ONCA 410 (Can. Ont. C.A.), para. 43. 
213
 MARK ORKIN, THE LAW OF COSTS 2-301 – 2-302 (2nd ed., August 2010). 
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to Rule 57.07.  It would appear that a negligence standard is fairly 
entrenched in Ontario.  
 
IV. INSIGHTS FROM CONVERGENCE 
 
This study of the law in the United States, England, and 
Canada reveals that these three common law countries have, 
beginning in the mid-1980s to early 1990s, converged upon a 
negligence standard to evaluate a lawyer’s conduct in the context 
of deciding if a costs order should be made against that lawyer 
personally. This fourth and final part considers what broader 
insights might be derived from this analysis through the lens of 
two inquiries: (1) what might be the reasons why this convergence 
has occurred? and (2) what might be some concerns with the move 
to adopting a negligence standard in this area? 
 
A. Why Convergence? 
 
One might have anticipated that these jurisdictions would 
differ in their treatment of costs awards against lawyers personally, 
because of their very different approaches to other costs questions.  
Because the United States has a baseline rule of no cost-shifting, 
whereas England, Canada each implement a “loser pays” system of 
costs, one might reasonably predict that the threshold at which a 
lawyer is required to pay the fees of an opposing party would be 
higher in the United States than in these three other countries. In 
other words, one might have expected the general American 
reluctance to shift costs to affect conservatively the circumstances 
under which costs will be shifted in this particular scenario.
214
  
Further, given the distinctive culture of “adversarial legalism” that 
                                                        
214
 The United States Supreme Court has, on several occasions, distinguished 
Rule 11 from a “fee-shifting statute.” See, for example, Justice O’Connor’s 
comments in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’n Enter., Inc., 498 U.S. 
533, 553 (1991):  
Rule 11 sanctions do not constitute the kind of fee shifting at 
issue in Alyeska. Rule 11 sanctions are not tied to the outcome 
of litigation; the relevant inquiry is whether a specific filing 
was, if not successful, at least well founded. Nor do sanctions 
shift the entire cost of litigation; they shift only the cost of a 
discrete event. Finally, the Rule calls only for “an appropriate 
sanction” -- attorney's fees are not mandated. As we explained 
in Cooter & Gell: “Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute . . . . ‘A 
movant under Rule 11 has no entitlement to fees or any other 
sanction.’” 
Very recently, the Third Circuit echoed this sentiment in Ario v. Underwriting 
Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds, 618 F.3d 277, 297 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating 
that “Rule 11's ‘primary purpose is not ‘wholesale fee shifting but [rather] 
correction of litigation abuse’”) (citing Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 
F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
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has been said to exist in the United States, one might also have 
predicted that American courts would be more restrained in their 
powers to require lawyers to pay personally the fees of an 
opposing party than courts in the other countries.
215
  That is, if the 
culture of lawyering is more adversarial in the United States than 
in the other countries, we might anticipate that American lawyers 
will be treated as owing fewer obligations to the parties that their 
clients oppose and, as a consequence, will be held responsible for 
an opposing party’s legal fees in more limited circumstances.  
These intuitions have not been borne out:  the United States 
employs a relatively similar standard to those articulated in 
England and Canada in deciding if a lawyer should be required to 
pay for an opposing party’s fees. 
 
One might also have expected that the three countries 
would approach the issue of when a lawyer should be personally 
responsible for costs of litigation differently, in view of their 
different histories in approaching lawyer negligence generally.  
Lawyers in England were long protected from actions in 
negligence under the doctrine of “advocates’ immunity”.   One 
explanation of the introduction of a negligence standard into the 
English courts’ wasted costs jurisdiction is that this jurisdictional 
expansion was intended to encroach upon or mitigate the effect of 
the general bar on holding lawyers accountable for negligence in 
civil actions.  In view of the fact that neither the United States nor 
Canada has recognized a comparable immunity for lawyers, one 
might have expected less need or enthusiasm in these two countries 
for supplementing the availability of a civil action in negligence 
against lawyers with civil procedure rules that evaluate and 
sanction lawyers’ negligence.  Yet, all three countries employ a 
relatively similar standard. 
 
Why, then, this convergence to a negligence standard?  
Each jurisdiction was facing mounting concerns at the time about 
both the efficacy of its civil justice system and the ability of the 
legal profession to properly regulate itself.   In England, the 
question of self-regulation came to the fore most dramatically in 
the enactment of the Legal Services Act, 2007.  Two of the major 
reforms initiated by the legislation were the establishment of a 
single, independent regulator and a single, independent office to 
handle consumer complaints and lawyer discipline.
216
  As summed 
                                                        
215
 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
LAW 239 (2001) (discussing the role “adversarial legalism” plays in counsel fees 
in the United States). 
216
 See JOAN LOUGHREY, CORPORATE LAWYERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
276–77 (2011) (outlining key areas of reform implemented by England’s Legal 
Services Act 2007); see also Paul D. Paton, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: 
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up by one commentator, one result of the introduction of this 
legislation was “the effective end of self-regulation, replaced by a 
front-line regulator with closer ties to government.”217 While 
developments in the United States and Canada have been less 
dramatic, self-regulation of the profession has also been under 
attack in these two jurisdictions in recent years.
218
   One possible 
characterization of the introduction in these jurisdictions of more 
robust mechanisms for imposing costs against lawyers is as 
compensation for perceived failures of the self-regulation of the 
legal profession as well as part of broader reforms seeking to make 
the civil justice system more responsive to the realities of modern 
litigation. 
 
B. Concerns with a Move to a Negligence Standard 
 
Whatever the reasons for this convergence, the move in all 
three counties to a negligence standard invites the question of 
whether, as a substantive matter, the use of a negligence standard 
in this particular context is a coherent and desirable way to 
regulate lawyer conduct.  One fundamental question that has not 
been answered satisfactorily in any of the three jurisdictions 
canvassed is:  what, exactly, is the “new form of legal malpractice” 
being established?  As a general matter, in cases of “traditional” 
legal malpractice (i.e. civil actions against lawyers for negligence), 
a lawyer is evaluated against her “reasonably competent” 
counterpart in terms of the legal skill and diligence that she has 
                                                                                                                            
The Future of Self-Regulation—Canada Between the United States and the 
English/Australian Experience, 2008 J. PROF. L. 87, 96 (2008) (summarizing the 
main components of England’s Legal Services Act 2007). 
217
 See Paul D. Paton, Cooperation, Co-option or Coercion? The FATF Lawyer 
Guidance and Regulation of the Legal Profession, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 165, 165 
(2010) (noting fundamental changes effectuated by England’s Legal Services 
Act 2007).   
218
 One of the most significant examples in the American context is the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s assertion of regulatory authority over 
the securities bar.  For a detailed discussion of this development, see DANIEL 
MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC AGE 239–41 (2008). A notable Canadian example critical of the 
self-regulation of the legal profession can be found in the Competition Bureau’s 
2007 report on self-regulated professions, which viewed certain measures in the 
self-regulated legal profession as anti-competitive.  As part of a diplomatically 
worded conclusion, the Report stated that self-regulated professions in Canada 
“currently face a situation that is rich with opportunities to benefit from 
increased competition.” See Competition Bureau of Canada, Study on Self-
Regulated Professions: Balancing Competition and Regulation, Dec. 11, 2007, 
xi, available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/vwapj/Professions%20study%20final%20E.pdf/$FILE/ 
Professions%20study%20final%20E.pdf (concluding that self-regulated 
professions could be more competitive).  
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employed in pursuing her client’s cause.  In contrast, in 
determining whether or not a costs award should be made against a 
lawyer personally as a result of the lawyer’s allegedly improper 
litigation conduct, the court is often concerned not with whether 
the lawyer in question met the requisite level of skill and care 
owed to her client, but rather if the lawyer satisfied her obligations 
to the court and to opposing parties.  These obligations have 
largely been historically understood in terms of requirements 
rooted in intent and purpose rather than skill and care.  For 
example, a lawyer is required to refrain from abusing the courts’ 
processes or violating certain minimum standards of “fair play” in 
relation to one’s opponents.219  What does it mean for a lawyer to 
be “negligent” in relation to these obligations?  The focus in 
relation to obligations owed to the court and to one’s adversary 
does not seem to be rooted in competence (or, at least, only rooted 
in competence) but also seems to engage the issue of fidelity to 
prescribed boundaries of role of an advocate.  
 
Alternatively, if the intention in adopting a negligence 
standard in this context is to move beyond traditional 
understandings of a lawyer’s duty to the court and to opponents 
and to create new and more expansive obligations, what are these 
obligations?   Asking what the “reasonably competent” lawyer 
would do cannot be the starting point if a new, expansive code of 
conduct is being articulated.  An inquiry into the conduct of a 
“reasonably competent” lawyer presumes an established 
professional norm.  Further, the creation of more expansive 
obligations generates its own concerns and, in particular, a worry 
that lawyers will find themselves in the untenable position of 
choosing between representing their clients with all due vigor and 
skill or protecting themselves from financial penalties.  As 
explored above, courts in each of three countries examined have 
expressed concern about this very issue.  In the American context, 
both courts and commentators have commonly articulated concern 
about this potential conflict in term of Rule 11’s “chilling effect” – 
that is, the worry that Rule 11 puts a damper on vigorous advocacy 
or the bringing of novel or creative claims.
220
  English courts have 
                                                        
219
 For examples of standards in the American legal profession, see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 110–15 (2000) 
(stating things that a lawyer must be wary of not doing while practicing law); 
see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1–3.4 (2006) (elaborating on 
rules of professional conduct regarding meritorious claims and contentions, 
expediting litigation, candor towards the tribunal, and fairness to opposing party 
and counsel).  
220
 See, e.g., Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, 
Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 566 (1991) (explaining that redistribution of costs under 
Rule 11 has the potential to deter meritorious lawsuits) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); see also Eastway Construc. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F. 2d 
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expressed the same worry in context of their efforts, as reviewed 
above, to insulate “hopeless cases” from the application of the 
court’s wasted costs jurisdiction.221   The “extreme caution” 
principle espoused by Canadian courts seeks to mitigate the same 
perceived risk.
222 
 
Regardless of the means employed by each country to 
temper the use of a negligence standard, it is unclear whether any 
of these jurisdictions have fundamentally come to terms with the 
consequences of introducing “a new form of legal malpractice” in 
this area.   Neither the “hopeless case” carve-out in England nor 
the “extreme caution” advocated by the Canadian courts, let alone 
the American “safe-harbor” provisions, shed much light into what 
duties of care lawyers are purported to owe to courts and 
opponents and how conflicts between these duties and lawyers’ 
duties to their clients are to be resolved.  To repeat the 
observations of Lord Hobhouse quoted above, although “ideally” a 
lawyer’s duty to one’s client should not conflict with the lawyer’s 
duty to the court, the practical realities of litigation risk giving rise 
to circumstances that are not always “clear-cut.” Moreover, it also 
bears mentioning that there been virtually no examination of the 
tension in the case law “between denying any duty of care [in the 
context of civil causes of action] by a lawyer to his client’s 
opponent (save in exceptional circumstances), and permitting the 
latter to recover wasted costs from the lawyer.”223 Possible 
tensions between a lawyer’s obligations under statutory provisions 
created personal liability for costs and other duties owed by the 
lawyer to his or her client and the court will be, no doubt, 
something that each jurisdiction will have to continue to deal with 
into the future. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Although the general approach to costs in the American 
civil justice system is commonly cited as an example of “American 
                                                                                                                            
243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (opining that Rule 11 sanctions are not intended to chill 
zealous advocacy); see also GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES 
AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES, 483–86 (2d ed. 1992); see also Carol Rice 
Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First Amendment Challenge, 
61 OHIO ST. L. J. 665, 706–07 (2000) (citing courts’ confusion in enforcing Rule 
11 sanctions where there is an otherwise meritorious claim); see also Danielle 
Kie Hart, supra note 68 at 2 (2002) (criticizing Rule 11 and its effect of 
inhibiting the development of the common law and zealous advocacy). 
221
 See Ridehalgh, [1994] A.C. at 233 (cautioning against abuse of process to 
pursue a “hopeless” case). 
222
 See Carleton, [2009] 96 O.R. 3d  at para. 15 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.) (advocating 
“extreme caution” standard in awarding costs against a lawyer). 
223
 See HUGH EVANS, LAWYERS’ LIABILITIES 91, 141 (2002). 
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exceptionalism” in civil procedure, a multi-jurisdictional 
examination of this particular treatment of litigation expenses 
reveals that the United States is, in fact, aligned with England and 
Canada in converging to a negligence standard.  As explored 
above, one way to understand this convergence is as part of 
broader and more globally held concerns with civil justice reform 
and the regulation of the legal profession.  Further, the fact that the 
courts in each of these jurisdictions have voiced anxiety in relation 
to the use of a negligence standard in this area, in my view, brings 
into sharp relief unresolved concerns about using this particular 
standard in this context. Whether and how each of these 
jurisdictions ultimately deal with this latent issue remains to be 
seen. 
 
 
